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chore: go mod tidy / vendor / make deps

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decentral1se
2025-10-02 08:25:31 +02:00
parent 1c10e64c58
commit d63a1c28ea
505 changed files with 34448 additions and 35285 deletions
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23
vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/join.go generated vendored
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@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
// Copyright (C) 2014-2015 Docker Inc & Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Copyright (C) 2017-2025 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
@ -11,9 +13,9 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"syscall"
)
const maxSymlinkLimit = 255
"github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/internal/consts"
)
// IsNotExist tells you if err is an error that implies that either the path
// accessed does not exist (or path components don't exist). This is
@ -49,12 +51,13 @@ func hasDotDot(path string) bool {
return strings.Contains("/"+path+"/", "/../")
}
// SecureJoinVFS joins the two given path components (similar to [filepath.Join]) except
// that the returned path is guaranteed to be scoped inside the provided root
// path (when evaluated). Any symbolic links in the path are evaluated with the
// given root treated as the root of the filesystem, similar to a chroot. The
// filesystem state is evaluated through the given [VFS] interface (if nil, the
// standard [os].* family of functions are used).
// SecureJoinVFS joins the two given path components (similar to
// [filepath.Join]) except that the returned path is guaranteed to be scoped
// inside the provided root path (when evaluated). Any symbolic links in the
// path are evaluated with the given root treated as the root of the
// filesystem, similar to a chroot. The filesystem state is evaluated through
// the given [VFS] interface (if nil, the standard [os].* family of functions
// are used).
//
// Note that the guarantees provided by this function only apply if the path
// components in the returned string are not modified (in other words are not
@ -78,7 +81,7 @@ func hasDotDot(path string) bool {
// fully resolved using [filepath.EvalSymlinks] or otherwise constructed to
// avoid containing symlink components. Of course, the root also *must not* be
// attacker-controlled.
func SecureJoinVFS(root, unsafePath string, vfs VFS) (string, error) {
func SecureJoinVFS(root, unsafePath string, vfs VFS) (string, error) { //nolint:revive // name is part of public API
// The root path must not contain ".." components, otherwise when we join
// the subpath we will end up with a weird path. We could work around this
// in other ways but users shouldn't be giving us non-lexical root paths in
@ -138,7 +141,7 @@ func SecureJoinVFS(root, unsafePath string, vfs VFS) (string, error) {
// It's a symlink, so get its contents and expand it by prepending it
// to the yet-unparsed path.
linksWalked++
if linksWalked > maxSymlinkLimit {
if linksWalked > consts.MaxSymlinkLimit {
return "", &os.PathError{Op: "SecureJoin", Path: root + string(filepath.Separator) + unsafePath, Err: syscall.ELOOP}
}