It's worth to warn user as soon as possilbe when OOM happend.
Signed-off-by: Hu Keping <hukeping@huawei.com>
Upstream-commit: f05bacbe509823e2ca65583f35188ca09d01db80
Component: engine
Using @mavenugo's patch for enabling the libcontainer pre-start hook to
be used for network namespace initialization (correcting the conflict
with user namespaces); updated the boolean check to the more generic
SupportsHooks() name, and fixed the hook state function signature.
Signed-off-by: Madhu Venugopal <madhu@docker.com>
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Phil Estes <estesp@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (github: estesp)
Upstream-commit: e148e763b8e7879855022690fdea88a6bf869195
Component: engine
This changeset creates /dev/shm and /dev/mqueue mounts for each container under
/var/lib/containers/<id>/ and bind mounts them into the container. When --ipc:container<id/name>
is used, then the /dev/shm and /dev/mqueue of the ipc container are used instead of creating
new ones for the container.
Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com>
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> (github: rhatdan)
Upstream-commit: d88fe447df0e87b3a57f9d08b108b141dd72678c
Component: engine
Signed-off-by: Stefan J. Wernli <swernli@microsoft.com>
Windows: add support for images stored in alternate location.
Signed-off-by: Stefan J. Wernli <swernli@microsoft.com>
Upstream-commit: dfbb5520e3b35030f3eef38d5a2d86ad20ea0a2f
Component: engine
Introduce a write denial for files at the root of /proc.
This prohibits root users from performing a chmod of those
files. The rules for denials in proc are also cleaned up,
making the rules better match their targets.
Locally tested on:
- Ubuntu precise (12.04) with AppArmor 2.7
- Ubuntu trusty (14.04) with AppArmor 2.8.95
Signed-off-by: Eric Windisch <eric@windisch.us>
Upstream-commit: 7342d59114fe443ae8d59474abb59280f014c493
Component: engine
This reverts commit 40b71adee390e9c06471b89ed845132b4ec80177.
Original commit (for which this is effectively a rebased version) is
72a500e9e5929b038816d8bd18d462a19e571c99 and was provided by Lei Jitang
<leijitang@huawei.com>.
Signed-off-by: Tim Dettrick <t.dettrick@uq.edu.au>
Upstream-commit: 03f65b3d0d66ccdc8b69a447b75508d594007600
Component: engine
The 'deny ptrace' statement was supposed to only ignore
ptrace failures in the AUDIT log. However, ptrace was implicitly
allowed from unconfined processes (such as the docker daemon and
its integration tests) due to the abstractions/base include.
This rule narrows the definition such that it will only ignore
the failures originating inside of the container and will not
cause denials when the daemon or its tests ptrace inside processes.
Introduces positive and negative tests for ptrace /w apparmor.
Signed-off-by: Eric Windisch <eric@windisch.us>
Upstream-commit: f5c388b35a9ddd699b3dbbe85b80fa02234f8355
Component: engine
This caused a regression with LSM labeling.
Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <crosbymichael@gmail.com>
Upstream-commit: bfc51cf6605ebcf7a4ec791fb0f3b5ae7b05c6fd
Component: engine
Integration tests were failing due to proc filter behavior
changes with new apparmor policies.
Also include the missing docker-unconfined policy resolving
potential startup errors. This policy is complain-only so
it should behave identically to the standard unconfined policy,
but will not apply system path-based policies within containers.
Signed-off-by: Eric Windisch <eric@windisch.us>
Upstream-commit: 5832715052e9e165cc40a5ac8178fa62685985aa
Component: engine
This allow us to avoid entropy usage in non-crypto critical places.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Morozov <lk4d4@docker.com>
Upstream-commit: 6bca8ec3c9ccc169c53b3d7060fe5c8ba8670aac
Component: engine
Will attempt to load profiles automatically. If loading fails
but the profiles are already loaded, execution will continue.
A hard failure will only occur if Docker cannot load
the profiles *and* they have not already been loaded via
some other means.
Also introduces documentation for AppArmor.
Signed-off-by: Eric Windisch <eric@windisch.us>
Upstream-commit: 3edc88f76df6a3bc9d887de8157ec71730c9057a
Component: engine
By using the 'unconfined' policy for privileged
containers, we have inherited the host's apparmor
policies, which really make no sense in the
context of the container's filesystem.
For instance, policies written against
the paths of binaries such as '/usr/sbin/tcpdump'
can be easily circumvented by moving the binary
within the container filesystem.
Fixes GH#5490
Signed-off-by: Eric Windisch <eric@windisch.us>
Upstream-commit: 87376c3add7dcd48830060652554e7ae43d11881
Component: engine
It's introduced in
68ba5f0b69c9f38 (Execdriver implementation on new libcontainer API)
But I don't see reson why we need it.
Signed-off-by: Qiang Huang <h.huangqiang@huawei.com>
Upstream-commit: af3059855c0b59c08b115a70d3f61b0fab3270de
Component: engine
It was used only by integration tests, which now gone.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Morozov <lk4d4@docker.com>
Upstream-commit: 6ae377ffa0c106749db1bcd6cf158f8b0056dea8
Component: engine
