Also more verbose error.
Fixes panic from #7701
Signed-off-by: Alexandr Morozov <lk4d4math@gmail.com>
Upstream-commit: 17b95ecb08f1705bd74d6c94c8bcfd4c87ccfca6
Component: engine
It could catch error that was fixed in #6954
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Alexandr Morozov <lk4d4math@gmail.com> (github: LK4D4)
Upstream-commit: 4162309d116fe5cb171d7d212842fe5406c544df
Component: engine
We add a --device flag which can be used like:
docker run --device /dev/sda:/dev/xvda:rwm ubuntu /bin/bash
To allow the container to have read write permissions to access the host's /dev/sda via a node named /dev/xvda in the container.
Note: Much of this code was written by Dinesh Subhraveti dineshs@altiscale.com (github: dineshs-altiscale) and so he deserves a ton of credit.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Timothy <timothyhobbs@seznam.cz> (github: timthelion)
Upstream-commit: e855c4b92170534864b920ec1e267b3a815764f9
Component: engine
In that case /etc/resolv.conf will be generated with no search
option. Usage: --dns-search=.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Fabio Falci <fabiofalci@gmail.com> (github: fabiofalci)
Upstream-commit: 804b00cd7d1f084a872211e5043d255c454c8e51
Component: engine
We discussed this at the docker plumbers meetup and for tools and
working on the system for things like boot2docker and coreos this is
needed. You can already bypass this check so we felt it is ok to start
allowing this feature.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@docker.com> (github: crosbymichael)
Upstream-commit: e39b8eade1f42503b6b7217e72eff4c8fdc13cb6
Component: engine
We now have one place that keeps track of (most) devices that are allowed and created within the container. That place is pkg/libcontainer/devices/devices.go
This fixes several inconsistencies between which devices were created in the lxc backend and the native backend. It also fixes inconsistencies between wich devices were created and which were allowed. For example, /dev/full was being created but it was not allowed within the cgroup. It also declares the file modes and permissions of the default devices, rather than copying them from the host. This is in line with docker's philosphy of not being host dependent.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Timothy Hobbs <timothyhobbs@seznam.cz> (github: https://github.com/timthelion)
Upstream-commit: 608702b98064a4dfd70b5ff0bd6fb45d2429f45b
Component: engine
It has been pointed out that some files in /proc and /sys can be used
to break out of containers. However, if those filesystems are mounted
read-only, most of the known exploits are mitigated, since they rely
on writing some file in those filesystems.
This does not replace security modules (like SELinux or AppArmor), it
is just another layer of security. Likewise, it doesn't mean that the
other mitigations (shadowing parts of /proc or /sys with bind mounts)
are useless. Those measures are still useful. As such, the shadowing
of /proc/kcore is still enabled with both LXC and native drivers.
Special care has to be taken with /proc/1/attr, which still needs to
be mounted read-write in order to enable the AppArmor profile. It is
bind-mounted from a private read-write mount of procfs.
All that enforcement is done in dockerinit. The code doing the real
work is in libcontainer. The init function for the LXC driver calls
the function from libcontainer to avoid code duplication.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Jérôme Petazzoni <jerome@docker.com> (github: jpetazzo)
Upstream-commit: 1c4202a6142d238d41f10deff1f0548f7591350b
Component: engine
Without this patch, containers inherit the open file descriptors of the daemon, so my "exec 42>&2" allows us to "echo >&42 some nasty error with some bad advice" directly into the daemon log. :)
Also, "hack/dind" was already doing this due to issues caused by the inheritance, so I'm removing that hack too since this patch obsoletes it by generalizing it for all containers.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Andrew Page <admwiggin@gmail.com> (github: tianon)
Upstream-commit: d5d62ff95574a48816890d8d6e0785a79f559c3c
Component: engine
