This patch adds pause/unpause to the command line, api, and drivers
for use on containers. This is implemented using the cgroups/freeze
utility in libcontainer and lxc freeze/unfreeze.
Co-Authored-By: Eric Windisch <ewindisch@docker.com>
Co-Authored-By: Chris Alfonso <calfonso@redhat.com>
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Ian Main <imain@redhat.com> (github: imain)
Upstream-commit: b054569cde788b2111ddbc4080b215dcda89f06e
Component: engine
This is a fix for a race condition in the LXC driver. This is described
more in issue #6092.
Closes#6092
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Shane Canon <scanon@lbl.gov> (github: scanon)
Upstream-commit: f9705477d023c63fb316a30204761aa1e3cb3e6d
Component: engine
This also makes sure that devices are pointers to avoid copies
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
Upstream-commit: 69989b7c06b0ca6737e83ddf8fcfa2dfccc57a7c
Component: engine
We now have one place that keeps track of (most) devices that are allowed and created within the container. That place is pkg/libcontainer/devices/devices.go
This fixes several inconsistencies between which devices were created in the lxc backend and the native backend. It also fixes inconsistencies between wich devices were created and which were allowed. For example, /dev/full was being created but it was not allowed within the cgroup. It also declares the file modes and permissions of the default devices, rather than copying them from the host. This is in line with docker's philosphy of not being host dependent.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Timothy Hobbs <timothyhobbs@seznam.cz> (github: https://github.com/timthelion)
Upstream-commit: 608702b98064a4dfd70b5ff0bd6fb45d2429f45b
Component: engine
Fixes#5692
This change requires lxc 1.0+ to work and breaks lxc versions less than
1.0 for host networking. We think that this is a find tradeoff by
bumping docker to only support lxc 1.0
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
Upstream-commit: 0f278940947d74f2b7889ada18808779312f9608
Component: engine
All modern distros set up /run to be a tmpfs, see for instance:
https://wiki.debian.org/ReleaseGoals/RunDirectory
Its a very useful place to store pid-files, sockets and other things
that only live at runtime and that should not be stored in the image.
This is also useful when running systemd inside a container, as it
will try to mount /run if not already mounted, which will fail for
non-privileged container.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com> (github: alexlarsson)
Upstream-commit: 905795ece624675abe2ec2622b0bbafdb9d7f44c
Component: engine
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Fernando Mayo <fernando@tutum.co> (github: fermayo)
Upstream-commit: 752c57ae567813f354aca66ff51d8d64100ae01b
Component: engine
We don't have the flexibility to do extra things with lxc because it is
a black box and most fo the magic happens before we get a chance to
interact with it in dockerinit.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
Upstream-commit: 59fe77bfa638001cbe9af386f350d6e0dbb23398
Component: engine
This also cleans up some of the left over restriction paths code from
before.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
Upstream-commit: f5139233b930e436707a65cc032aa2952edd6e4a
Component: engine
It has been pointed out that some files in /proc and /sys can be used
to break out of containers. However, if those filesystems are mounted
read-only, most of the known exploits are mitigated, since they rely
on writing some file in those filesystems.
This does not replace security modules (like SELinux or AppArmor), it
is just another layer of security. Likewise, it doesn't mean that the
other mitigations (shadowing parts of /proc or /sys with bind mounts)
are useless. Those measures are still useful. As such, the shadowing
of /proc/kcore is still enabled with both LXC and native drivers.
Special care has to be taken with /proc/1/attr, which still needs to
be mounted read-write in order to enable the AppArmor profile. It is
bind-mounted from a private read-write mount of procfs.
All that enforcement is done in dockerinit. The code doing the real
work is in libcontainer. The init function for the LXC driver calls
the function from libcontainer to avoid code duplication.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Jérôme Petazzoni <jerome@docker.com> (github: jpetazzo)
Upstream-commit: 1c4202a6142d238d41f10deff1f0548f7591350b
Component: engine
Kernel capabilities for privileged syslog operations are currently splitted into
CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_SYSLOG since the following commit:
http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=ce6ada35bdf710d16582cc4869c26722547e6f11
This patch drops CAP_SYSLOG to prevent containers from messing with
host's syslog (e.g. `dmesg -c` clears up host's printk ring buffer).
Closes#5491
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Eiichi Tsukata <devel@etsukata.com> (github: Etsukata)
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
Upstream-commit: cac0cea03f85191b3d92cdaeae827fdd93fb1b29
Component: engine
Without this patch, containers inherit the open file descriptors of the daemon, so my "exec 42>&2" allows us to "echo >&42 some nasty error with some bad advice" directly into the daemon log. :)
Also, "hack/dind" was already doing this due to issues caused by the inheritance, so I'm removing that hack too since this patch obsoletes it by generalizing it for all containers.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Andrew Page <admwiggin@gmail.com> (github: tianon)
Upstream-commit: d5d62ff95574a48816890d8d6e0785a79f559c3c
Component: engine
