Signed-off-by: Darren Stahl <darst@microsoft.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1f28844d7869609f371ab2a7881e4488a79a7e27)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Exec processes do not automatically inherit AppArmor
profiles from the container.
This patch sets the AppArmor profile for the exec
process.
Before this change:
apparmor_parser -q -r <<EOF
#include <tunables/global>
profile deny-write flags=(attach_disconnected) {
#include <abstractions/base>
file,
network,
deny /tmp/** w,
capability,
}
EOF
docker run -dit --security-opt "apparmor=deny-write" --name aa busybox
docker exec aa sh -c 'mkdir /tmp/test'
(no error)
With this change applied:
docker exec aa sh -c 'mkdir /tmp/test'
mkdir: can't create directory '/tmp/test': Permission denied
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 8f3308ae10ec9ad0dd4edfb46fde53a0e1e19b34)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Ingress networks will no longer automatically remove their
load-balancing endpoint (and sandbox) automatically when the network is
otherwise upopulated. This is to prevent automatic removal of the
ingress networks when all the containers leave them. Therefore
explicit removal of an ingress network also requires explicit removal
of its load-balancing endpoint.
Signed-off-by: Chris Telfer <ctelfer@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3da4ebf355d3494d1403b2878a1ae6958b2724e9)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
The test case checks that in case of IpcMode: private and
ReadonlyRootfs: true (as in "docker run --ipc private --read-only")
the resulting /dev/shm mount is NOT made read-only.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 33dd562e3acff71ee18a2543d14fcbecf9bf0e62)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
It has been pointed out that if --read-only flag is given, /dev/shm
also becomes read-only in case of --ipc private.
This happens because in this case the mount comes from OCI spec
(since commit 7120976d74195), and is a regression caused by that
commit.
The meaning of --read-only flag is to only have a "main" container
filesystem read-only, not the auxiliary stuff (that includes /dev/shm,
other mounts and volumes, --tmpfs, /proc, /dev and so on).
So, let's make sure /dev/shm that comes from OCI spec is not made
read-only.
Fixes: 7120976d74195 ("Implement none, private, and shareable ipc modes")
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit cad74056c09f6276b0f4a996a1511553177cd3d7)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
With the inclusion of PR 30897, creating service for host network
fails in 18.02. Modified IsPreDefinedNetwork check and return
NetworkNameError instead of errdefs.Forbidden to address this issue
Signed-off-by: selansen <elango.siva@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7cf8b20762cc9491f52ff3f3d94c880378183696)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
When a container is created if "--network" is set to "host" all the
ports in the container are bound to the host.
Thus, adding "-p" or "--publish" to the command-line is meaningless.
Unlike "docker run" and "docker create", "docker service create" sends
an error message when network mode is host and port bindings are given
This patch however suggests to send a warning message to the client when
such a case occurs.
The warning message is added to "warnings" which are returned from
"verifyPlatformContainerSettings".
Signed-off-by: Boaz Shuster <ripcurld.github@gmail.com>
Upstream-commit: 6e78fdb790d2e1dbf95a1733cab9395b1b936622
Component: engine
On unix, merge secrets/configs handling. This is important because
configs can contain secrets (via templating) and potentially a config
could just simply have secret information "by accident" from the user.
This just make sure that configs are as secure as secrets and de-dups a
lot of code.
Generally this makes everything simpler and configs more secure.
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
Upstream-commit: c02171802b788fb2d4d48bebcee2a57c8eabeeaa
Component: engine
This makes configs and secrets behavior identical.
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
Upstream-commit: 8e8f5f4457d8e1b02031576dbc18c903be4bcfb6
Component: engine
This is only for the case when dockerd has had to re-mount the daemon
root as shared.
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
Upstream-commit: 487c6c7e73dbb7871e80d75f176dd2a3539a2947
Component: engine
This ensures that all log plugins are registered when the log validator
is run.
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
Upstream-commit: b0b9a25e7e60abbe143e149ccaaf4dfb62044016
Component: engine
When tailing a container log, if the log file is empty it will cause the
log stream to abort with an unexpected `EOF`.
Note that this only applies to the "current" log file as rotated files
cannot be empty.
This fix just skips adding the "current" file the log tail if it is
empty.
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
Upstream-commit: f40860c5f3d3575629d4a932207e866c1fea625d
Component: engine
Since commit e9b9e4ace294230c6b8eb has landed, there is a chance that
container.RWLayer is nil (due to some half-removed container). Let's
check the pointer before use to avoid any potential nil pointer
dereferences, resulting in a daemon crash.
Note that even without the abovementioned commit, it's better to perform
an extra check (even it's totally redundant) rather than to have a
possibility of a daemon crash. In other words, better be safe than
sorry.
[v2: add a test case for daemon.getInspectData]
[v3: add a check for container.Dead and a special error for the case]
Fixes: e9b9e4ace294230c6b8eb
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
Upstream-commit: 195893d38160c0893e326b8674e05ef6714aeaa4
Component: engine
The imageRefs map was being popualted with containerID, and accessed
with an imageID which would never match.
Remove this broken code because: 1) it hasn't ever worked so isn't
necessary, and 2) because at best it would be racy
ImageDelete() should already handle preventing of removal of used
images.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Nephin <dnephin@docker.com>
Upstream-commit: 3aa4f7f0d71f04c5cc93d5e80cbdd47b0b5fdb7f
Component: engine
Before this change, volume management was relying on the fact that
everything the plugin mounts is visible on the host within the plugin's
rootfs. In practice this caused some issues with mount leaks, so we
changed the behavior such that mounts are not visible on the plugin's
rootfs, but available outside of it, which breaks volume management.
To fix the issue, allow the plugin to scope the path correctly rather
than assuming that everything is visible in `p.Rootfs`.
In practice this is just scoping the `PropagatedMount` paths to the
correct host path.
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
Upstream-commit: 0e5eaf8ee32662182147f5f62c1bfebef66f5c47
Component: engine
