cgalo5758
5829091881
The contained runner that drove the 2026-09 security audit, the README review and four rounds of design ideation lived only inside the ignored notebook. It moves to scripts/agent-runner/: the prepare, tools, audit, ideation and teardown scripts, the compose and container files, the allowlist proxy and the prompt templates, with the paths that assumed the notebook fixed and findings written to a caller-named directory. Run outputs, transcripts and the round-specific sheet scripts stay behind. docs/agent-runner.md states the method: the disposable git archive copy and the fail-closed proxy, how a task is shaped, union rather than intersection of findings across models, separate adjudication of every finding against the source, and the evidence a finding must carry.
1.4 KiB
1.4 KiB
T03 — The CSRF/auth exemption coupling
Threat model. An unauthenticated attacker on the internet requests the
paths that are exempt from CSRF, which CONTEXT.md shows are also exempt from
authentication.
Slice. internal/server/server.go lines 390-420 and 540-570 and 685-690,
internal/integrations/integration.go, each integration's declaration
(stripe.go, discourse.go, fedwiki.go), the /domains/ask handler, and
internal/server/route_aware_handler*.go.
Questions.
- Enumerate every currently exempt path. For each, what authenticates the caller instead of a session, and is that check actually reached?
- Is exemption matched exactly, or by prefix? Can a request shape a path that matches the exemption but routes to a different handler (trailing slash, encoded characters, path traversal, differing case, duplicate slashes)?
/domains/askis unauthenticated by design. What can an arbitrary internet caller learn or change through it, and is that the intended blast radius?routeAwareapplies auth only to requests matching a registered pattern. What happens to a request that matches no pattern, and can that be used to skip middleware?- If an integration author adds one path to
CSRFExemptPaths, what exactly have they turned off? Is anything stopping them from exempting a session-bearing browser route?
Not in scope. The webhook signature checks themselves (T04).