go.mod

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ require (
 	github.com/docker/cli v28.4.0+incompatible
 	github.com/docker/docker v28.5.2+incompatible
 	github.com/docker/go-units v0.5.0
-	github.com/go-git/go-git/v5 v5.19.0
+	github.com/go-git/go-git/v5 v5.19.1
 	github.com/google/go-cmp v0.7.0
 	github.com/leonelquinteros/gotext v1.7.2
 	github.com/moby/sys/signal v0.7.1

go.sum

@@ -393,8 +393,8 @@ github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5 v5.9.0 h1:jItGXszUDRtR/AlferWPTMN4j38BQ88XnXKbilmm
 github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5 v5.9.0/go.mod h1:jCnQMLj9eUgGU7+ludSTYoZL/GGmii14RxKFj7ROgHw=
 github.com/go-git/go-git-fixtures/v4 v4.3.2-0.20231010084843-55a94097c399 h1:eMje31YglSBqCdIqdhKBW8lokaMrL3uTkpGYlE2OOT4=
 github.com/go-git/go-git-fixtures/v4 v4.3.2-0.20231010084843-55a94097c399/go.mod h1:1OCfN199q1Jm3HZlxleg+Dw/mwps2Wbk9frAWm+4FII=
-github.com/go-git/go-git/v5 v5.19.0 h1:+WkVUQZSy/F1Gb13udrMKjIM2PrzsNfDKFSfo5tkMtc=
-github.com/go-git/go-git/v5 v5.19.0/go.mod h1:Pb1v0c7/g8aGQJwx9Us09W85yGoyvSwuhEGMH7zjDKQ=
+github.com/go-git/go-git/v5 v5.19.1 h1:nX27AnaU43/K5bKktKwgBmR9lawoYVe1Ckg0rgzzN00=
+github.com/go-git/go-git/v5 v5.19.1/go.mod h1:Pb1v0c7/g8aGQJwx9Us09W85yGoyvSwuhEGMH7zjDKQ=
 github.com/go-gl/glfw v0.0.0-20190409004039-e6da0acd62b1/go.mod h1:vR7hzQXu2zJy9AVAgeJqvqgH9Q5CA+iKCZ2gyEVpxRU=
 github.com/go-gl/glfw/v3.3/glfw v0.0.0-20191125211704-12ad95a8df72/go.mod h1:tQ2UAYgL5IevRw8kRxooKSPJfGvJ9fJQFa0TUsXzTg8=
 github.com/go-gl/glfw/v3.3/glfw v0.0.0-20200222043503-6f7a984d4dc4/go.mod h1:tQ2UAYgL5IevRw8kRxooKSPJfGvJ9fJQFa0TUsXzTg8=

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/config/config.go

@@ -61,6 +61,16 @@ type Config struct {
 		CommentChar string
 		// RepositoryFormatVersion identifies the repository format and layout version.
 		RepositoryFormatVersion format.RepositoryFormatVersion
+		// ProtectNTFS controls whether NTFS-specific path protections are
+		// applied (e.g. rejecting .git trailing spaces/periods, alternate
+		// data streams, 8.3 short names). When unset, defaults to true on
+		// Windows.
+		ProtectNTFS OptBool
+		// ProtectHFS controls whether HFS+-specific path protections are
+		// applied (e.g. rejecting .git with Unicode zero-width or
+		// directional characters that HFS+ would normalize away).
+		// When unset, defaults to true on macOS.
+		ProtectHFS OptBool
 	}
 
 	User struct {
@@ -266,6 +276,8 @@ const (
 	repositoryFormatVersionKey = "repositoryformatversion"
 	objectFormat               = "objectformat"
 	mirrorKey                  = "mirror"
+	protectNTFSKey             = "protectNTFS"
+	protectHFSKey              = "protectHFS"
 
 	// DefaultPackWindow holds the number of previous objects used to
 	// generate deltas. The value 10 is the same used by git command.
@@ -309,6 +321,14 @@ func (c *Config) unmarshalCore() {
 
 	c.Core.Worktree = s.Options.Get(worktreeKey)
 	c.Core.CommentChar = s.Options.Get(commentCharKey)
+
+	if parsed := parseConfigBool(s.Options.Get(protectNTFSKey)); parsed.IsSet() {
+		c.Core.ProtectNTFS = parsed
+	}
+
+	if parsed := parseConfigBool(s.Options.Get(protectHFSKey)); parsed.IsSet() {
+		c.Core.ProtectHFS = parsed
+	}
 }
 
 func (c *Config) unmarshalUser() {
@@ -379,7 +399,8 @@ func unmarshalSubmodules(fc *format.Config, submodules map[string]*Submodule) {
 		m := &Submodule{}
 		m.unmarshal(sub)
 
-		if m.Validate() == ErrModuleBadPath {
+		if err := m.Validate(); errors.Is(err, ErrModuleBadPath) ||
+			errors.Is(err, ErrModuleBadName) {
 			continue
 		}
 
@@ -436,6 +457,14 @@ func (c *Config) marshalCore() {
 	if c.Core.Worktree != "" {
 		s.SetOption(worktreeKey, c.Core.Worktree)
 	}
+
+	if c.Core.ProtectNTFS.IsSet() {
+		s.SetOption(protectNTFSKey, c.Core.ProtectNTFS.FormatBool())
+	}
+
+	if c.Core.ProtectHFS.IsSet() {
+		s.SetOption(protectHFSKey, c.Core.ProtectHFS.FormatBool())
+	}
 }
 
 func (c *Config) marshalExtensions() {

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/config/modules.go

@@ -3,8 +3,11 @@ package config
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"errors"
+	"fmt"
 	"regexp"
+	"strings"
 
+	"github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/internal/pathutil"
 	format "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing/format/config"
 )
 
@@ -12,6 +15,7 @@ var (
 	ErrModuleEmptyURL  = errors.New("module config: empty URL")
 	ErrModuleEmptyPath = errors.New("module config: empty path")
 	ErrModuleBadPath   = errors.New("submodule has an invalid path")
+	ErrModuleBadName   = errors.New("ignoring suspicious submodule name")
 )
 
 var (
@@ -94,6 +98,10 @@ type Submodule struct {
 
 // Validate validates the fields and sets the default values.
 func (m *Submodule) Validate() error {
+	if err := validSubmoduleName(m.Name); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrModuleBadName, m.Name)
+	}
+
 	if m.Path == "" {
 		return ErrModuleEmptyPath
 	}
@@ -109,6 +117,50 @@ func (m *Submodule) Validate() error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+// validSubmoduleName mirrors canonical Git's check_submodule_name in
+// submodule-config.c [1]: reject empty names and any name with a ".."
+// path component, using both '/' and '\\' as separators so the rule
+// is consistent across platforms. The component check is delegated to
+// `pathutil.IsHFSDot` and `pathutil.IsNTFSDot` with `.` as the needle,
+// which both cover the bare ".." case and reject components that
+// resolve to ".." after HFS+ Unicode normalisation (ignored code
+// points, e.g. `.<U+200C>.`) or NTFS trailing-space/dot/ADS
+// canonicalisation (e.g. `.. `, `..::$INDEX_ALLOCATION`).
+// `.gitmodules` is attacker-controlled by definition, so both checks
+// run unconditionally regardless of host OS.
+//
+// The additional checks (bare ".", NUL byte, leading or trailing
+// separator, drive-letter prefix) close go-git-specific edge cases
+// the canonical loop does not exercise: canonical Git treats names
+// as opaque C strings, while Go strings carry NULs through and the
+// billy filesystem layer is path-aware in ways Git's working storage
+// is not.
+//
+// [1]: https://github.com/git/git/blob/v2.54.0/submodule-config.c#L214-L237
+func validSubmoduleName(name string) error {
+	if name == "" || name == "." {
+		return ErrModuleBadName
+	}
+	for _, seg := range strings.FieldsFunc(name, isPathSep) {
+		if pathutil.IsHFSDot(seg, ".") || pathutil.IsNTFSDot(seg, ".", "") {
+			return ErrModuleBadName
+		}
+	}
+	// go-git-specific defensive checks beyond canonical Git.
+	if strings.ContainsRune(name, 0) {
+		return ErrModuleBadName
+	}
+	if isPathSep(rune(name[0])) || isPathSep(rune(name[len(name)-1])) {
+		return ErrModuleBadName
+	}
+	if len(name) >= 2 && name[1] == ':' {
+		return ErrModuleBadName
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func isPathSep(r rune) bool { return r == '/' || r == '\\' }
+
 func (m *Submodule) unmarshal(s *format.Subsection) {
 	m.raw = s
 

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/config/optbool.go

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+package config
+
+import (
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// OptBool is a tri-state boolean: unset, explicitly false, or explicitly true.
+// Its zero value (OptBoolUnset) means the setting was not specified, which
+// allows merge logic based on reflect.Value.IsZero to skip unset fields while
+// still letting an explicit "false" override a previously set "true".
+type OptBool byte
+
+const (
+	// OptBoolUnset indicates the setting was not specified.
+	OptBoolUnset OptBool = iota
+	// OptBoolFalse indicates the setting was explicitly set to false.
+	OptBoolFalse
+	// OptBoolTrue indicates the setting was explicitly set to true.
+	OptBoolTrue
+)
+
+// NewOptBool converts a plain bool into an OptBool.
+func NewOptBool(v bool) OptBool {
+	if v {
+		return OptBoolTrue
+	}
+	return OptBoolFalse
+}
+
+// IsTrue returns whether the value is explicitly true.
+func (o OptBool) IsTrue() bool { return o == OptBoolTrue }
+
+// IsSet returns whether the value was explicitly specified (true or false).
+func (o OptBool) IsSet() bool { return o != OptBoolUnset }
+
+func (o OptBool) String() string {
+	switch o {
+	case OptBoolTrue:
+		return "true"
+	case OptBoolFalse:
+		return "false"
+	default:
+		return "unset"
+	}
+}
+
+// FormatBool returns the strconv-formatted value. Only meaningful when IsSet.
+func (o OptBool) FormatBool() string {
+	return strconv.FormatBool(o.IsTrue())
+}
+
+// parseConfigBool mirrors upstream Git's git_parse_maybe_bool: it
+// accepts true/yes/on (→ OptBoolTrue) and false/no/off (→
+// OptBoolFalse) case-insensitively, plus any decimal integer (zero
+// → OptBoolFalse, non-zero → OptBoolTrue). Empty or otherwise
+// unrecognised values return OptBoolUnset, leaving the caller's
+// platform default in place. The empty-string handling is the only
+// intentional divergence from upstream, which returns false for
+// empty: in our unmarshalCore caller, an empty value means the key
+// is unset and the platform default should apply.
+//
+// Reference: upstream Git git_parse_maybe_bool_text at parse.c
+// L157-L173 and git_parse_maybe_bool at parse.c L174-L182 in tag
+// v2.54.0[1].
+//
+// [1]: https://github.com/git/git/blob/v2.54.0/parse.c#L157-L182
+func parseConfigBool(v string) OptBool {
+	switch strings.ToLower(v) {
+	case "true", "yes", "on":
+		return OptBoolTrue
+	case "false", "no", "off":
+		return OptBoolFalse
+	}
+	if i, err := strconv.Atoi(v); err == nil {
+		if i != 0 {
+			return OptBoolTrue
+		}
+		return OptBoolFalse
+	}
+	return OptBoolUnset
+}

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/internal/pathutil/dotgit.go

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+package pathutil
+
+import "strings"
+
+// IsDotGitName reports whether name is `.git` or its 8.3 NTFS short
+// alias `git~1`, case-insensitively. Both are forbidden as path
+// components (and as submodule names) because they refer to the
+// repository's own metadata directory.
+//
+// File names that do not conform to the 8.3 format (up to eight
+// characters for the basename, three for the file extension) are
+// associated with a so-called "short name" on NTFS — at least on
+// the `C:` drive by default — which means that `git~1/` is a valid
+// way to refer to `.git/`.
+func IsDotGitName(name string) bool {
+	switch strings.ToLower(name) {
+	case ".git", "git~1":
+		return true
+	}
+	return false
+}

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/internal/pathutil/hfs.go

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+package pathutil
+
+import "unicode"
+
+// hfsIgnoredCodepoints contains Unicode code points that HFS+ ignores
+// during path normalization. A path component containing these
+// characters between the bytes of ".git" (or ".gitmodules", etc.)
+// will be treated as that name by HFS+, so they have to be filtered
+// out before comparison.
+//
+// See upstream Git utf8.c next_hfs_char in tag v2.54.0[1].
+//
+// [1]: https://github.com/git/git/blob/v2.54.0/utf8.c#L703-L740
+var hfsIgnoredCodepoints = map[rune]struct{}{
+	0x200c: {}, // ZERO WIDTH NON-JOINER
+	0x200d: {}, // ZERO WIDTH JOINER
+	0x200e: {}, // LEFT-TO-RIGHT MARK
+	0x200f: {}, // RIGHT-TO-LEFT MARK
+	0x202a: {}, // LEFT-TO-RIGHT EMBEDDING
+	0x202b: {}, // RIGHT-TO-LEFT EMBEDDING
+	0x202c: {}, // POP DIRECTIONAL FORMATTING
+	0x202d: {}, // LEFT-TO-RIGHT OVERRIDE
+	0x202e: {}, // RIGHT-TO-LEFT OVERRIDE
+	0x206a: {}, // INHIBIT SYMMETRIC SWAPPING
+	0x206b: {}, // ACTIVATE SYMMETRIC SWAPPING
+	0x206c: {}, // INHIBIT ARABIC FORM SHAPING
+	0x206d: {}, // ACTIVATE ARABIC FORM SHAPING
+	0x206e: {}, // NATIONAL DIGIT SHAPES
+	0x206f: {}, // NOMINAL DIGIT SHAPES
+	0xfeff: {}, // ZERO WIDTH NO-BREAK SPACE
+}
+
+// IsHFSDot reports whether part would be treated as ".<needle>" on an
+// HFS+ filesystem after stripping ignored Unicode code points and
+// folding ASCII to lower case. The needle is the lowercase ASCII
+// suffix without the leading dot (e.g. "git", "gitmodules"). It
+// mirrors upstream Git's is_hfs_dot_generic and is the building
+// block of IsHFSDotGit / IsHFSDotGitmodules.
+//
+// Reference: upstream Git utf8.c is_hfs_dot_generic at L741-L774 and
+// the dotgit family at L784-L809 in tag v2.54.0[1].
+//
+// [1]: https://github.com/git/git/blob/v2.54.0/utf8.c#L741-L809
+func IsHFSDot(part, needle string) bool {
+	runes := []rune(part)
+	i := 0
+
+	// skip ignored code points, then expect '.'
+	for i < len(runes) {
+		if _, ok := hfsIgnoredCodepoints[runes[i]]; !ok {
+			break
+		}
+		i++
+	}
+	if i >= len(runes) || runes[i] != '.' {
+		return false
+	}
+	i++
+
+	// match needle case-insensitively, skipping ignored code points
+	for _, expected := range needle {
+		for i < len(runes) {
+			if _, ok := hfsIgnoredCodepoints[runes[i]]; !ok {
+				break
+			}
+			i++
+		}
+		if i >= len(runes) {
+			return false
+		}
+		r := runes[i]
+		if r > 127 {
+			return false
+		}
+		if unicode.ToLower(r) != expected {
+			return false
+		}
+		i++
+	}
+
+	// skip trailing ignored code points
+	for i < len(runes) {
+		if _, ok := hfsIgnoredCodepoints[runes[i]]; !ok {
+			break
+		}
+		i++
+	}
+
+	// must be at end of component
+	return i == len(runes)
+}
+
+// IsHFSDotGit reports whether part is an HFS+ equivalent of ".git".
+func IsHFSDotGit(part string) bool { return IsHFSDot(part, "git") }
+
+// IsHFSDotGitmodules reports whether part is an HFS+ equivalent of
+// ".gitmodules", catching attempts to plant the file via Unicode
+// code points that HFS+ would strip during normalisation.
+func IsHFSDotGitmodules(part string) bool { return IsHFSDot(part, "gitmodules") }

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/internal/pathutil/ntfs.go

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+package pathutil
+
+import "strings"
+
+// IsNTFSDotGit ports upstream Git's is_ntfs_dotgit. It detects path
+// components that NTFS would resolve to ".git": the canonical name
+// itself and its 8.3 short-name alias "git~1", each followed by any
+// number of trailing spaces or periods (which NTFS silently trims)
+// and an optional Alternate Data Stream suffix (":<stream>"). The
+// bare strings ".git" and "git~1" also match, mirroring upstream.
+//
+// Reference: upstream Git path.c is_ntfs_dotgit at L1415-L1449
+// in tag v2.54.0[1].
+//
+// [1]: https://github.com/git/git/blob/v2.54.0/path.c#L1415-L1449
+func IsNTFSDotGit(part string) bool {
+	var i int
+	switch {
+	case len(part) >= 4 && part[0] == '.' &&
+		asciiToLower(part[1]) == 'g' &&
+		asciiToLower(part[2]) == 'i' &&
+		asciiToLower(part[3]) == 't':
+		i = 4
+	case len(part) >= 5 &&
+		asciiToLower(part[0]) == 'g' &&
+		asciiToLower(part[1]) == 'i' &&
+		asciiToLower(part[2]) == 't' &&
+		part[3] == '~' && part[4] == '1':
+		i = 5
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+
+	for ; i < len(part); i++ {
+		c := part[i]
+		if c == ':' {
+			return true
+		}
+		if c != '.' && c != ' ' {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// WindowsValidPath reports whether part is a valid Windows / NTFS
+// path component for the worktree filesystem abstraction. It rejects
+// NTFS-disguised variants of `.git` and `git~1` (trailing spaces,
+// periods, Alternate Data Streams) and Windows reserved device
+// names. Bare `.git` and `git~1` are allowed at this layer; the
+// caller decides whether they are permissible at the current path
+// position.
+func WindowsValidPath(part string) bool {
+	if IsNTFSDotGit(part) && !IsDotGitName(part) {
+		return false
+	}
+	return !isWindowsReservedName(part)
+}
+
+// windowsReservedNames lists the Windows reserved device names.
+// A path component is reserved if its base name (ignoring trailing
+// spaces, extensions, and NTFS Alternate Data Streams) matches one of
+// these case-insensitively.
+//
+// See upstream Git compat/mingw.c is_valid_win32_path().
+var windowsReservedNames = []string{
+	"CON", "PRN", "AUX", "NUL",
+	"COM1", "COM2", "COM3", "COM4", "COM5", "COM6", "COM7", "COM8", "COM9",
+	"LPT1", "LPT2", "LPT3", "LPT4", "LPT5", "LPT6", "LPT7", "LPT8", "LPT9",
+	"CONIN$", "CONOUT$",
+}
+
+func isWindowsReservedName(part string) bool {
+	for _, name := range windowsReservedNames {
+		if len(part) < len(name) {
+			continue
+		}
+		if !strings.EqualFold(part[:len(name)], name) {
+			continue
+		}
+		// Exact match or followed by space, dot, colon (ADS), or separator.
+		if len(part) == len(name) {
+			return true
+		}
+		switch part[len(name)] {
+		case ' ', '.', ':':
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// IsNTFSDot ports upstream Git's is_ntfs_dot_generic. It detects NTFS
+// path-component variants of a dotfile name that attackers can use to
+// bypass case-insensitive comparisons against the canonical name on
+// Windows. The dotgit parameter is the lowercase name without the
+// leading dot (e.g. "gitmodules"); shortnamePrefix is the canonical
+// 6-character NTFS short-name prefix used as a fall-back match
+// (e.g. "gi7eba" for ".gitmodules").
+//
+// Reference: upstream Git path.c is_ntfs_dot_generic at L1451-L1507
+// in tag v2.54.0[1].
+//
+// [1]: https://github.com/git/git/blob/v2.54.0/path.c#L1451-L1507
+func IsNTFSDot(name, dotgit, shortnamePrefix string) bool {
+	// onlySpacesAndPeriods returns true when the suffix from start
+	// onwards consists only of trailing spaces and periods, possibly
+	// terminated by a NTFS Alternate Data Stream colon. Mirrors the
+	// only_spaces_and_periods label in upstream's is_ntfs_dot_generic.
+	onlySpacesAndPeriods := func(start int) bool {
+		for i := start; i < len(name); i++ {
+			c := name[i]
+			if c == ':' {
+				return true
+			}
+			if c != ' ' && c != '.' {
+				return false
+			}
+		}
+		return true
+	}
+
+	// Pattern 1: ".<dotgit>" prefix + trailing spaces / periods / ADS.
+	if len(name) >= len(dotgit)+1 && name[0] == '.' &&
+		strings.EqualFold(name[1:1+len(dotgit)], dotgit) {
+		if onlySpacesAndPeriods(len(dotgit) + 1) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Pattern 2: standard NTFS short name <dotgit[:6]>~[1-4].
+	if len(dotgit) >= 6 && len(name) >= 8 &&
+		strings.EqualFold(name[:6], dotgit[:6]) &&
+		name[6] == '~' && name[7] >= '1' && name[7] <= '4' {
+		if onlySpacesAndPeriods(8) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Pattern 3: fall-back NTFS short name keyed by shortnamePrefix.
+	if len(shortnamePrefix) < 6 || len(name) < 8 {
+		return false
+	}
+	sawTilde := false
+	i := 0
+	for i < 8 {
+		c := name[i]
+		switch {
+		case sawTilde:
+			if c < '0' || c > '9' {
+				return false
+			}
+		case c == '~':
+			i++
+			if i >= len(name) || name[i] < '1' || name[i] > '9' {
+				return false
+			}
+			sawTilde = true
+		case i >= 6:
+			return false
+		case c&0x80 != 0:
+			return false
+		default:
+			if asciiToLower(c) != shortnamePrefix[i] {
+				return false
+			}
+		}
+		i++
+	}
+	return onlySpacesAndPeriods(8)
+}
+
+// IsNTFSDotGitmodules reports whether part is an NTFS-equivalent of
+// ".gitmodules" — the file name (or any of its variants that NTFS
+// would resolve to it) that attackers can use to plant submodule
+// configuration disguised as a symlink. The 6-character canonical
+// short-name prefix "gi7eba" mirrors upstream Git's is_ntfs_dotgitmodules.
+func IsNTFSDotGitmodules(part string) bool {
+	return IsNTFSDot(part, "gitmodules", "gi7eba")
+}
+
+func asciiToLower(c byte) byte {
+	if c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z' {
+		return c + ('a' - 'A')
+	}
+	return c
+}

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/internal/pathutil/tree.go

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+package pathutil
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// ErrInvalidPath is returned by ValidTreePath when its argument is
+// not a safe path to materialise into the worktree.
+var ErrInvalidPath = fmt.Errorf("invalid path")
+
+// ValidTreePath rejects path strings that, if materialised into a
+// worktree, would let an attacker-controlled tree entry escape the
+// worktree or rewrite repository metadata. It rejects:
+//
+//   - control characters (< 0x20, 0x7f);
+//   - empty paths and "." / ".." components;
+//   - Windows volume name prefixes (e.g. C:);
+//   - .git, its 8.3 NTFS short-name git~1, plus their HFS+ and NTFS
+//     variants — at every position, not just the root.
+//
+// HFS+/NTFS variants of `.git` are always rejected at this layer
+// regardless of runtime config: tree paths are canonical UTF-8 with
+// no zero-width characters or NTFS short-name forms, so an entry
+// that looks like a disguised `.git` is suspicious anywhere. Windows
+// reserved device names (CON, NUL, etc.) are not policed here — they
+// are legitimate filenames on non-Windows filesystems and upstream
+// Git accepts them. The wrapper layer (validPath in package git)
+// rejects them at materialisation time when core.protectNTFS is on.
+//
+// Mirrors upstream Git's verify_path_internal at read-cache.c#L987
+// in tag v2.54.0[1] with protect_hfs / protect_ntfs treated as
+// always-on for `.git`-disguise detection (tree paths are not
+// application-supplied) and is_valid_win32_path left to the wrapper.
+//
+// [1]: https://github.com/git/git/blob/v2.54.0/read-cache.c#L987
+func ValidTreePath(p string) error {
+	for i := 0; i < len(p); i++ {
+		if p[i] < 0x20 || p[i] == 0x7f {
+			return fmt.Errorf("%w %q: contains control character", ErrInvalidPath, p)
+		}
+	}
+
+	parts := strings.FieldsFunc(p, func(r rune) bool { return r == '\\' || r == '/' })
+	if len(parts) == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrInvalidPath, p)
+	}
+
+	// Volume names are not supported, in both formats: \\ and <DRIVE_LETTER>:.
+	if vol := filepath.VolumeName(p); vol != "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrInvalidPath, p)
+	}
+
+	for _, part := range parts {
+		if part == "." || part == ".." {
+			return fmt.Errorf("%w %q: cannot use %q", ErrInvalidPath, p, part)
+		}
+
+		if IsDotGitName(part) || IsHFSDotGit(part) || IsNTFSDotGit(part) {
+			return fmt.Errorf("%w component: %q", ErrInvalidPath, p)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/internal/url/url.go

@@ -2,12 +2,14 @@ package url
 
 import (
 	"regexp"
+	"runtime"
+	"strings"
 )
 
 var (
 	isSchemeRegExp = regexp.MustCompile(`^[^:]+://`)
 
-	// Ref: https://github.com/git/git/blob/master/Documentation/urls.txt#L37
+	// Ref: https://github.com/git/git/blob/v2.54.0/Documentation/urls.adoc#L41-L48
 	scpLikeUrlRegExp = regexp.MustCompile(`^(?:(?P<user>[^@]+)@)?(?P<host>[^:\s]+):(?:(?P<port>[0-9]{1,5}):)?(?P<path>[^\\].*)$`)
 )
 
@@ -20,7 +22,38 @@ func MatchesScheme(url string) bool {
 // MatchesScpLike returns true if the given string matches an SCP-like
 // format scheme.
 func MatchesScpLike(url string) bool {
-	return scpLikeUrlRegExp.MatchString(url)
+	if !scpLikeUrlRegExp.MatchString(url) {
+		return false
+	}
+	// Mirror canonical Git's url_is_local_not_ssh in connect.c[1] for
+	// the cases the regex above cannot disambiguate by itself: a URL
+	// is treated as a local path (not SCP-style SSH) when a `/`
+	// precedes the first `:` (e.g. `./relative:path`,
+	// `/abs/with:colon/file`), or — on Windows only — when it has a
+	// DOS drive prefix like `C:foo` where the host is a single
+	// ASCII letter.
+	//
+	// [1]: https://github.com/git/git/blob/v2.54.0/connect.c#L710-L716
+	if before, _, _ := strings.Cut(url, ":"); strings.Contains(before, "/") {
+		return false
+	}
+	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" && hasDosDrivePrefix(url) {
+		return false
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// hasDosDrivePrefix reports whether s begins with `<letter>:` (a
+// Windows drive prefix such as `C:` or `c:`). Mirrors canonical Git's
+// win32_has_dos_drive_prefix[1].
+//
+// [1]: https://github.com/git/git/blob/v2.54.0/compat/win32/path-utils.c#L20-L29
+func hasDosDrivePrefix(s string) bool {
+	if len(s) < 2 || s[1] != ':' {
+		return false
+	}
+	c := s[0]
+	return ('A' <= c && c <= 'Z') || ('a' <= c && c <= 'z')
 }
 
 // FindScpLikeComponents returns the user, host, port and path of the

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing/format/idxfile/decoder.go

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
+	"io/fs"
 
 	"github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing/hash"
 	"github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/utils/binary"
@@ -25,35 +26,88 @@ const (
 	objectIDLength = hash.Size
 )
 
+// Byte sizes of the idx v2 layout elements, used by the size formula
+// in [validateIdxV2Size]. See [gitformat-pack] for the canonical
+// layout.
+//
+// [gitformat-pack]: https://git-scm.com/docs/gitformat-pack
+const (
+	headerLen     = 8          // magic + version
+	fanoutLen     = fanout * 4 // uint32 per bucket
+	crc32Len      = 4          // CRC32 per object
+	offset32Len   = 4          // 32-bit offset per object
+	offset64Len   = 8          // 64-bit overflow offset
+	trailerHashes = 2          // pack checksum + idx checksum, each hashsz
+)
+
+// statInput is the optional shape the [Decoder] probes for at the
+// start of [Decoder.Decode] to learn the on-disk length of the idx
+// blob, which it uses to validate the canonical-Git size formula
+// before any allocations driven by the fanout table. Callers that
+// pass an [*os.File] or a `billy.File` backed by an `*os.File`
+// (the production call sites in `storage/filesystem`) satisfy it
+// directly; arbitrary [io.Reader]s do not, and decode for them
+// retains the pre-existing behaviour of erroring out at the
+// truncated-payload boundary instead.
+//
+// The interface is intentionally unexported so the public
+// [NewDecoder] signature stays compatible with v5.
+type statInput interface {
+	Stat() (fs.FileInfo, error)
+}
+
 // Decoder reads and decodes idx files from an input stream.
 type Decoder struct {
 	io.Reader
-	h hash.Hash
+	src io.Reader
+	h   hash.Hash
 }
 
 // NewDecoder builds a new idx stream decoder, that reads from r.
 func NewDecoder(r io.Reader) *Decoder {
 	h := hash.New(crypto.SHA1)
 	tr := io.TeeReader(r, h)
-	return &Decoder{tr, h}
+	return &Decoder{tr, r, h}
 }
 
 // Decode reads from the stream and decode the content into the MemoryIndex struct.
 func (d *Decoder) Decode(idx *MemoryIndex) error {
+	idxSize := int64(-1)
+	if in, ok := d.src.(statInput); ok {
+		fi, err := in.Stat()
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("%w: stat input: %w", ErrMalformedIdxFile, err)
+		}
+		idxSize = fi.Size()
+	}
+
 	if err := validateHeader(d); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 
-	flow := []func(*MemoryIndex, io.Reader) error{
+	headerFlow := []func(*MemoryIndex, io.Reader) error{
 		readVersion,
 		readFanout,
+	}
+	for _, f := range headerFlow {
+		if err := f(idx, d); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	if idxSize >= 0 {
+		if err := validateIdxV2Size(idx, idxSize); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	bodyFlow := []func(*MemoryIndex, io.Reader) error{
 		readObjectNames,
 		readCRC32,
 		readOffsets,
 		readPackChecksum,
 	}
-
-	for _, f := range flow {
+	for _, f := range bodyFlow {
 		if err := f(idx, d); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
@@ -199,3 +253,103 @@ func readIdxChecksum(idx *MemoryIndex, r io.Reader) error {
 
 	return nil
 }
+
+// validateIdxV2Size enforces the size formula used by canonical Git
+// load_idx for idx v2 files: the on-disk length must lie within
+// [minSize, maxSize] where
+//
+//	perObject = hashsz + crc32Len + offset32Len
+//	minSize   = headerLen + fanoutLen + trailerHashes*hashsz + nr*perObject
+//	maxSize   = minSize + (nr-1)*offset64Len     when nr > 0
+//
+// with nr taken from the last fanout entry and hashsz fixed at
+// [objectIDLength] (SHA-1 in v5). Multiplications use a self-checking
+// overflow guard so inputs whose claimed object count overflows the
+// formula are rejected rather than wrapping into a smaller value.
+func validateIdxV2Size(idx *MemoryIndex, idxSize int64) error {
+	nr := int64(idx.Fanout[fanout-1])
+	hashsz := int64(objectIDLength)
+
+	minSize := minIdxV2Size(nr, hashsz)
+	maxSize := maxIdxV2Size(nr, hashsz)
+	if minSize < 0 || maxSize < 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: object count %d is inconsistent with file size", ErrMalformedIdxFile, nr)
+	}
+
+	if idxSize < minSize || idxSize > maxSize {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: file size %d is inconsistent with object count %d", ErrMalformedIdxFile, idxSize, nr)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// minIdxV2Size returns the minimum on-disk size of an idx v2 file
+// holding nr objects with the given hash size, mirroring the
+// computation in canonical Git load_idx. Returns -1 when any
+// intermediate multiplication or addition would overflow int64.
+func minIdxV2Size(nr, hashsz int64) int64 {
+	perObject := hashsz + crc32Len + offset32Len
+	fixed := int64(headerLen+fanoutLen) + trailerHashes*hashsz
+
+	objects, ok := mulInt64(nr, perObject)
+	if !ok {
+		return -1
+	}
+	sum, ok := addInt64(fixed, objects)
+	if !ok {
+		return -1
+	}
+	return sum
+}
+
+// maxIdxV2Size returns the maximum on-disk size of an idx v2 file
+// holding nr objects with the given hash size, mirroring the
+// computation in canonical Git load_idx. Returns -1 on overflow.
+func maxIdxV2Size(nr, hashsz int64) int64 {
+	minSize := minIdxV2Size(nr, hashsz)
+	if minSize < 0 {
+		return -1
+	}
+	if nr == 0 {
+		return minSize
+	}
+	overflow, ok := mulInt64(nr-1, offset64Len)
+	if !ok {
+		return -1
+	}
+	sum, ok := addInt64(minSize, overflow)
+	if !ok {
+		return -1
+	}
+	return sum
+}
+
+// mulInt64 returns a*b and whether the result fits in an int64 without
+// overflow. Negative operands or overflow yield ok=false. The overflow
+// check uses the standard self-inverse identity: a*b/b == a only when
+// the multiplication did not wrap.
+func mulInt64(a, b int64) (int64, bool) {
+	if a < 0 || b < 0 {
+		return 0, false
+	}
+	if a == 0 || b == 0 {
+		return 0, true
+	}
+	c := a * b
+	if c/b != a {
+		return 0, false
+	}
+	return c, true
+}
+
+// addInt64 returns a+b and whether the result fits in an int64 without
+// overflow. Negative operands or overflow yield ok=false.
+func addInt64(a, b int64) (int64, bool) {
+	if a < 0 || b < 0 {
+		return 0, false
+	}
+	c := a + b
+	if c < a {
+		return 0, false
+	}
+	return c, true
+}

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing/format/idxfile/idxfile.go

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package idxfile
 
 import (
 	"bytes"
+	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"sort"
 	"sync"
@@ -126,7 +127,10 @@ func (idx *MemoryIndex) FindOffset(h plumbing.Hash) (int64, error) {
 		return 0, plumbing.ErrObjectNotFound
 	}
 
-	offset := idx.getOffset(k, i)
+	offset, err := idx.getOffset(k, i)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
 
 	// Save the offset for reverse lookup
 	idx.mu.Lock()
@@ -141,17 +145,19 @@ func (idx *MemoryIndex) FindOffset(h plumbing.Hash) (int64, error) {
 
 const isO64Mask = uint64(1) << 31
 
-func (idx *MemoryIndex) getOffset(firstLevel, secondLevel int) uint64 {
+func (idx *MemoryIndex) getOffset(firstLevel, secondLevel int) (uint64, error) {
 	offset := secondLevel << 2
 	ofs := encbin.BigEndian.Uint32(idx.Offset32[firstLevel][offset : offset+4])
 
 	if (uint64(ofs) & isO64Mask) != 0 {
 		offset := 8 * (uint64(ofs) & ^isO64Mask)
-		n := encbin.BigEndian.Uint64(idx.Offset64[offset : offset+8])
-		return n
+		if l := uint64(len(idx.Offset64)); l < 8 || offset > l-8 {
+			return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: offset64 index out of range", ErrMalformedIdxFile)
+		}
+		return encbin.BigEndian.Uint64(idx.Offset64[offset : offset+8]), nil
 	}
 
-	return uint64(ofs)
+	return uint64(ofs), nil
 }
 
 // FindCRC32 implements the Index interface.
@@ -209,8 +215,11 @@ func (idx *MemoryIndex) genOffsetHash() error {
 		mappedFirstLevel := idx.FanoutMapping[firstLevel]
 		for secondLevel := uint32(0); i < fanoutValue; i++ {
 			copy(hash[:], idx.Names[mappedFirstLevel][secondLevel*objectIDLength:])
-			offset := int64(idx.getOffset(mappedFirstLevel, int(secondLevel)))
-			offsetHash[offset] = hash
+			off, err := idx.getOffset(mappedFirstLevel, int(secondLevel))
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			offsetHash[int64(off)] = hash
 			secondLevel++
 		}
 	}
@@ -291,7 +300,11 @@ func (i *idxfileEntryIter) Next() (*Entry, error) {
 		mappedFirstLevel := i.idx.FanoutMapping[i.firstLevel]
 		entry := new(Entry)
 		copy(entry.Hash[:], i.idx.Names[mappedFirstLevel][i.secondLevel*objectIDLength:])
-		entry.Offset = i.idx.getOffset(mappedFirstLevel, i.secondLevel)
+		var err error
+		entry.Offset, err = i.idx.getOffset(mappedFirstLevel, i.secondLevel)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
 		entry.CRC32 = i.idx.getCRC32(mappedFirstLevel, i.secondLevel)
 
 		i.secondLevel++

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing/format/objfile/reader.go

@@ -11,9 +11,10 @@ import (
 )
 
 var (
-	ErrClosed       = errors.New("objfile: already closed")
-	ErrHeader       = errors.New("objfile: invalid header")
-	ErrNegativeSize = errors.New("objfile: negative object size")
+	ErrClosed        = errors.New("objfile: already closed")
+	ErrHeader        = errors.New("objfile: invalid header")
+	ErrHeaderNotRead = errors.New("objfile: Header must be called before Read")
+	ErrNegativeSize  = errors.New("objfile: negative object size")
 )
 
 // Reader reads and decodes compressed objfile data from a provided io.Reader.
@@ -100,12 +101,23 @@ func (r *Reader) prepareForRead(t plumbing.ObjectType, size int64) {
 //
 // If Read encounters the end of the data stream it will return err == io.EOF,
 // either in the current call if n > 0 or in a subsequent call.
+//
+// Read returns ErrHeaderNotRead if Header has not been called successfully.
 func (r *Reader) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	if r.multi == nil {
+		return 0, ErrHeaderNotRead
+	}
 	return r.multi.Read(p)
 }
 
 // Hash returns the hash of the object data stream that has been read so far.
+// It returns the zero plumbing.Hash if Header has not been called
+// successfully — guarding against the nil hasher that prepareForRead has
+// not yet allocated.
 func (r *Reader) Hash() plumbing.Hash {
+	if r.multi == nil {
+		return plumbing.ZeroHash
+	}
 	return r.hasher.Sum()
 }
 

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing/format/packfile/diff_delta.go

@@ -19,9 +19,6 @@ const (
 	// https://github.com/git/git/blob/f7466e94375b3be27f229c78873f0acf8301c0a5/diff-delta.c#L428
 	// Max size of a copy operation (64KB).
 	maxCopySize = 64 * 1024
-
-	// Min size of a copy operation.
-	minCopySize = 4
 )
 
 // GetDelta returns an EncodedObject of type OFSDeltaObject. Base and Target object,

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing/format/packfile/fsobject.go

@@ -78,7 +78,13 @@ func (o *FSObject) Reader() (io.ReadCloser, error) {
 			_ = f.Close()
 			return nil, err
 		}
-		return ioutil.NewReadCloserWithCloser(r, f.Close), nil
+		// Cap the lazy stream at the resolved object size: well-formed
+		// content reaches EOF inside the bound, an inflated stream that
+		// runs past surfaces ErrInflatedSizeMismatch on the byte just
+		// past the limit. For delta-resolved objects o.size is the
+		// expanded size, which is what the caller is reading here.
+		bounded := newBoundedReadCloser(r, o.size)
+		return ioutil.NewReadCloserWithCloser(bounded, f.Close), nil
 	}
 	r, err := p.getObjectContent(o.offset)
 	if err != nil {

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing/format/packfile/packfile.go

@@ -126,11 +126,17 @@ func (p *Packfile) nextObjectHeader() (*ObjectHeader, error) {
 	return h, err
 }
 
-func (p *Packfile) getDeltaObjectSize(buf *bytes.Buffer) int64 {
+func (p *Packfile) getDeltaObjectSize(buf *bytes.Buffer) (int64, error) {
 	delta := buf.Bytes()
-	_, delta = decodeLEB128(delta) // skip src size
-	sz, _ := decodeLEB128(delta)
-	return int64(sz)
+	_, delta, err := decodeLEB128(delta) // skip src size
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	sz, _, err := decodeLEB128(delta)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	return int64(sz), nil
 }
 
 func (p *Packfile) getObjectSize(h *ObjectHeader) (int64, error) {
@@ -145,7 +151,7 @@ func (p *Packfile) getObjectSize(h *ObjectHeader) (int64, error) {
 			return 0, err
 		}
 
-		return p.getDeltaObjectSize(buf), nil
+		return p.getDeltaObjectSize(buf)
 	default:
 		return 0, ErrInvalidObject.AddDetails("type %q", h.Type)
 	}
@@ -233,7 +239,10 @@ func (p *Packfile) getNextObject(h *ObjectHeader, hash plumbing.Hash) (plumbing.
 			return nil, err
 		}
 
-		size = p.getDeltaObjectSize(buf)
+		size, err = p.getDeltaObjectSize(buf)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
 		if size <= smallObjectThreshold {
 			var obj = new(plumbing.MemoryObject)
 			obj.SetSize(size)

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing/format/packfile/parser.go

@@ -26,6 +26,45 @@ var (
 	ErrDeltaNotCached = errors.New("delta could not be found in cache")
 )
 
+// maxObjectPreallocBytes caps the up-front size hint passed to
+// bytes.Buffer.Grow when staging an object's contents, so a malformed length
+// cannot trigger a huge or out-of-range allocation. The buffer still grows
+// dynamically as data is written; this is purely a hint cap.
+const maxObjectPreallocBytes = 1 << 30 // 1 GiB
+
+// maxObjectsPrealloc caps the up-front capacity reserved from the pack's
+// declared object count, so a header advertising an absurd quantity cannot
+// trigger a multi-gigabyte allocation. The slice and maps still grow
+// organically beyond this hint.
+const maxObjectsPrealloc = 1 << 16 // 64 Ki entries
+
+// Match upstream Git's pack depth ceiling: pack-objects.h OE_DEPTH_BITS,
+// enforced in builtin/pack-objects.c as (1 << OE_DEPTH_BITS) - 1.
+const maxDeltaChainDepth = 4095
+
+// growHint returns a non-negative int64 size, clamped to a sane upper bound,
+// suitable for passing to bytes.Buffer.Grow.
+func growHint(n int64) int {
+	switch {
+	case n <= 0:
+		return 0
+	case n > maxObjectPreallocBytes:
+		return maxObjectPreallocBytes
+	default:
+		return int(n)
+	}
+}
+
+// objectsHint returns a non-negative count, clamped to maxObjectsPrealloc,
+// suitable for passing to make() as the capacity hint for slices or maps
+// sized from a pack's declared object count.
+func objectsHint(n uint32) int {
+	if n > maxObjectsPrealloc {
+		return maxObjectsPrealloc
+	}
+	return int(n)
+}
+
 // Observer interface is implemented by index encoders.
 type Observer interface {
 	// OnHeader is called when a new packfile is opened.
@@ -166,9 +205,10 @@ func (p *Parser) init() error {
 	}
 
 	p.count = c
-	p.oiByHash = make(map[plumbing.Hash]*objectInfo, p.count)
-	p.oiByOffset = make(map[int64]*objectInfo, p.count)
-	p.oi = make([]*objectInfo, p.count)
+	hint := objectsHint(p.count)
+	p.oiByHash = make(map[plumbing.Hash]*objectInfo, hint)
+	p.oiByOffset = make(map[int64]*objectInfo, hint)
+	p.oi = make([]*objectInfo, 0, hint)
 
 	return nil
 }
@@ -261,7 +301,7 @@ func (p *Parser) indexObjects() error {
 		}
 		if delta && !p.scanner.IsSeekable {
 			buf.Reset()
-			buf.Grow(int(oh.Length))
+			buf.Grow(growHint(oh.Length))
 			writers = append(writers, buf)
 		}
 
@@ -306,7 +346,7 @@ func (p *Parser) indexObjects() error {
 		}
 
 		p.oiByOffset[oh.Offset] = ota
-		p.oi[i] = ota
+		p.oi = append(p.oi, ota)
 	}
 
 	return nil
@@ -317,8 +357,12 @@ func (p *Parser) resolveDeltas() error {
 	defer sync.PutBytesBuffer(buf)
 
 	for _, obj := range p.oi {
+		if err := checkDeltaChainDepth(obj); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+
 		buf.Reset()
-		buf.Grow(int(obj.Length))
+		buf.Grow(growHint(obj.Length))
 		err := p.get(obj, buf)
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
@@ -337,6 +381,9 @@ func (p *Parser) resolveDeltas() error {
 			// create it once and reuse across all children.
 			r := bytes.NewReader(buf.Bytes())
 			for _, child := range obj.Children {
+				if err := checkDeltaChainDepth(child); err != nil {
+					return err
+				}
 				// Even though we are discarding the output, we still need to read it to
 				// so that the scanner can advance to the next object, and the SHA1 can be
 				// calculated.
@@ -356,6 +403,17 @@ func (p *Parser) resolveDeltas() error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+func checkDeltaChainDepth(o *objectInfo) error {
+	var depth int
+	for current := o; current != nil && current.DiskType.IsDelta(); current = current.Parent {
+		depth++
+		if depth > maxDeltaChainDepth {
+			return fmt.Errorf("%w: delta chain depth exceeds %d", ErrMalformedPackFile, maxDeltaChainDepth)
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 func (p *Parser) resolveExternalRef(o *objectInfo) {
 	if ref, ok := p.oiByHash[o.SHA1]; ok && ref.ExternalRef {
 		p.oiByHash[o.SHA1] = o
@@ -405,7 +463,7 @@ func (p *Parser) get(o *objectInfo, buf *bytes.Buffer) (err error) {
 	if o.DiskType.IsDelta() {
 		b := sync.GetBytesBuffer()
 		defer sync.PutBytesBuffer(b)
-		buf.Grow(int(o.Length))
+		buf.Grow(growHint(o.Length))
 		err := p.get(o.Parent, b)
 		if err != nil {
 			return err

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing/format/packfile/patch_delta.go

@@ -31,10 +31,15 @@ const (
 	// premptively made available for a patch operation.
 	maxPatchPreemptionSize uint = 65536
 
-	// minDeltaSize defines the smallest size for a delta.
-	minDeltaSize = 4
+	// minDeltaSize is the smallest valid delta: a 1-byte srcSz LEB128
+	// header followed by a 1-byte targetSz LEB128 header (the
+	// shortest case being targetSz=0 with no operations).
+	minDeltaSize = 2
 )
 
+// uintBits is the bit width of uint on the current platform (32 or 64).
+const uintBits = 32 << (^uint(0) >> 63)
+
 type offset struct {
 	mask  byte
 	shift uint
@@ -142,7 +147,7 @@ func ReaderFromDelta(base plumbing.EncodedObject, deltaRC io.Reader) (io.ReadClo
 		baseBuf := bufio.NewReader(baseRd)
 		basePos := uint(0)
 
-		for {
+		for remainingTargetSz > 0 {
 			cmd, err := deltaBuf.ReadByte()
 			if err == io.EOF {
 				_ = dstWr.CloseWithError(ErrInvalidDelta)
@@ -166,9 +171,9 @@ func ReaderFromDelta(base plumbing.EncodedObject, deltaRC io.Reader) (io.ReadClo
 					return
 				}
 
-				if invalidSize(sz, targetSz) ||
+				if invalidSize(sz, remainingTargetSz) ||
 					invalidOffsetSize(offset, sz, srcSz) {
-					_ = dstWr.Close()
+					_ = dstWr.CloseWithError(ErrInvalidDelta)
 					return
 				}
 
@@ -210,7 +215,7 @@ func ReaderFromDelta(base plumbing.EncodedObject, deltaRC io.Reader) (io.ReadClo
 
 			case isCopyFromDelta(cmd):
 				sz := uint(cmd) // cmd is the size itself
-				if invalidSize(sz, targetSz) {
+				if invalidSize(sz, remainingTargetSz) {
 					_ = dstWr.CloseWithError(ErrInvalidDelta)
 					return
 				}
@@ -225,40 +230,48 @@ func ReaderFromDelta(base plumbing.EncodedObject, deltaRC io.Reader) (io.ReadClo
 				_ = dstWr.CloseWithError(ErrDeltaCmd)
 				return
 			}
-
-			if remainingTargetSz <= 0 {
-				_ = dstWr.Close()
-				return
-			}
 		}
+
+		// Mirror upstream's `data != top` post-loop check: every byte
+		// of the delta payload must be consumed.
+		if _, err := deltaBuf.ReadByte(); err == nil {
+			_ = dstWr.CloseWithError(ErrInvalidDelta)
+			return
+		} else if err != io.EOF {
+			_ = dstWr.CloseWithError(err)
+			return
+		}
+
+		_ = dstWr.Close()
 	}()
 
 	return dstRd, nil
 }
 
 func patchDelta(dst *bytes.Buffer, src, delta []byte) error {
-	if len(delta) < minCopySize {
-		return ErrInvalidDelta
+	srcSz, delta, err := decodeLEB128(delta)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrInvalidDelta, err)
 	}
-
-	srcSz, delta := decodeLEB128(delta)
 	if srcSz != uint(len(src)) {
 		return ErrInvalidDelta
 	}
 
-	targetSz, delta := decodeLEB128(delta)
+	targetSz, delta, err := decodeLEB128(delta)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrInvalidDelta, err)
+	}
 	remainingTargetSz := targetSz
 
-	var cmd byte
-
 	growSz := min(targetSz, maxPatchPreemptionSize)
 	dst.Grow(int(growSz))
-	for {
+
+	for remainingTargetSz > 0 {
 		if len(delta) == 0 {
 			return ErrInvalidDelta
 		}
 
-		cmd = delta[0]
+		cmd := delta[0]
 		delta = delta[1:]
 
 		switch {
@@ -275,16 +288,16 @@ func patchDelta(dst *bytes.Buffer, src, delta []byte) error {
 				return err
 			}
 
-			if invalidSize(sz, targetSz) ||
+			if invalidSize(sz, remainingTargetSz) ||
 				invalidOffsetSize(offset, sz, srcSz) {
-				break
+				return ErrInvalidDelta
 			}
 			dst.Write(src[offset : offset+sz])
 			remainingTargetSz -= sz
 
 		case isCopyFromDelta(cmd):
 			sz := uint(cmd) // cmd is the size itself
-			if invalidSize(sz, targetSz) {
+			if invalidSize(sz, remainingTargetSz) {
 				return ErrInvalidDelta
 			}
 
@@ -299,10 +312,12 @@ func patchDelta(dst *bytes.Buffer, src, delta []byte) error {
 		default:
 			return ErrDeltaCmd
 		}
+	}
 
-		if remainingTargetSz <= 0 {
-			break
-		}
+	// Mirror upstream's `data != top` post-loop check: every byte of
+	// the delta payload must be consumed.
+	if len(delta) != 0 {
+		return ErrInvalidDelta
 	}
 
 	return nil
@@ -354,7 +369,7 @@ func patchDeltaWriter(dst io.Writer, base io.ReaderAt, delta io.Reader,
 	baselr := io.LimitReader(sr, 0).(*io.LimitedReader)
 	deltalr := io.LimitReader(deltaBuf, 0).(*io.LimitedReader)
 
-	for {
+	for remainingTargetSz > 0 {
 		buf := *bufp
 		cmd, err := deltaBuf.ReadByte()
 		if err == io.EOF {
@@ -374,9 +389,9 @@ func patchDeltaWriter(dst io.Writer, base io.ReaderAt, delta io.Reader,
 				return 0, plumbing.ZeroHash, err
 			}
 
-			if invalidSize(sz, targetSz) ||
+			if invalidSize(sz, remainingTargetSz) ||
 				invalidOffsetSize(offset, sz, srcSz) {
-				return 0, plumbing.ZeroHash, err
+				return 0, plumbing.ZeroHash, ErrInvalidDelta
 			}
 
 			if _, err := sr.Seek(int64(offset), io.SeekStart); err != nil {
@@ -389,7 +404,7 @@ func patchDeltaWriter(dst io.Writer, base io.ReaderAt, delta io.Reader,
 			remainingTargetSz -= sz
 		} else if isCopyFromDelta(cmd) {
 			sz := uint(cmd) // cmd is the size itself
-			if invalidSize(sz, targetSz) {
+			if invalidSize(sz, remainingTargetSz) {
 				return 0, plumbing.ZeroHash, ErrInvalidDelta
 			}
 			deltalr.N = int64(sz)
@@ -399,30 +414,41 @@ func patchDeltaWriter(dst io.Writer, base io.ReaderAt, delta io.Reader,
 
 			remainingTargetSz -= sz
 		} else {
-			return 0, plumbing.ZeroHash, err
-		}
-		if remainingTargetSz <= 0 {
-			break
+			return 0, plumbing.ZeroHash, ErrDeltaCmd
 		}
 	}
 
+	// Mirror upstream's `data != top` post-loop check: every byte of
+	// the delta payload must be consumed.
+	if _, err := deltaBuf.ReadByte(); err == nil {
+		return 0, plumbing.ZeroHash, ErrInvalidDelta
+	} else if err != io.EOF {
+		return 0, plumbing.ZeroHash, err
+	}
+
 	return targetSz, hasher.Sum(), nil
 }
 
 // Decodes a number encoded as an unsigned LEB128 at the start of some
-// binary data and returns the decoded number and the rest of the
-// stream.
+// binary data and returns the decoded number, the rest of the stream,
+// and an error if the encoded value does not fit in a uint.
 //
 // This must be called twice on the delta data buffer, first to get the
 // expected source buffer size, and again to get the target buffer size.
-func decodeLEB128(input []byte) (uint, []byte) {
+func decodeLEB128(input []byte) (uint, []byte, error) {
 	if len(input) == 0 {
-		return 0, input
+		return 0, input, nil
 	}
 
 	var num, sz uint
 	var b byte
 	for {
+		// A continuation byte at shift > uintBits-7 cannot contribute
+		// without overflowing the accumulator.
+		if sz*7 > uintBits-7 {
+			return 0, input, ErrLengthOverflow
+		}
+
 		b = input[sz]
 		num |= (uint(b) & payload) << (sz * 7) // concats 7 bits chunks
 		sz++
@@ -432,12 +458,16 @@ func decodeLEB128(input []byte) (uint, []byte) {
 		}
 	}
 
-	return num, input[sz:]
+	return num, input[sz:], nil
 }
 
 func decodeLEB128ByteReader(input io.ByteReader) (uint, error) {
 	var num, sz uint
 	for {
+		if sz*7 > uintBits-7 {
+			return 0, ErrLengthOverflow
+		}
+
 		b, err := input.ReadByte()
 		if err != nil {
 			return 0, err
@@ -529,8 +559,9 @@ func decodeSize(cmd byte, delta []byte) (uint, []byte, error) {
 	return sz, delta, nil
 }
 
-func invalidSize(sz, targetSz uint) bool {
-	return sz > targetSz
+// invalidSize reports whether sz exceeds the remaining target size.
+func invalidSize(sz, remaining uint) bool {
+	return sz > remaining
 }
 
 func invalidOffsetSize(offset, sz, srcSz uint) bool {

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing/format/packfile/scanner.go

@@ -29,8 +29,100 @@ var (
 	ErrSeekNotSupported = NewError("not seek support")
 	// ErrMalformedPackFile is returned by the parser when the pack file is corrupted.
 	ErrMalformedPackFile = errors.New("malformed PACK file")
+	// ErrLengthOverflow is returned when a variable-length integer would not
+	// fit into its accumulator because the input declares more continuation
+	// bytes than the type can hold.
+	ErrLengthOverflow = errors.New("variable-length integer overflow")
+	// ErrInflatedSizeMismatch is returned when a packfile object inflates to
+	// more bytes than the size declared in its object header. A well-formed
+	// packfile never produces more data than the declared size; exceeding it
+	// indicates a structurally invalid entry.
+	ErrInflatedSizeMismatch = errors.New("packfile: inflated object exceeds declared size")
 )
 
+// boundedWriter passes writes through to w up to limit bytes total, then
+// returns ErrInflatedSizeMismatch. It is used to enforce that a packfile
+// object's inflated length does not exceed the size declared in its header.
+type boundedWriter struct {
+	w     io.Writer
+	limit int64
+	n     int64
+}
+
+// Write forwards p to the underlying writer while keeping the running total
+// at or below limit. On overrun it forwards the legal prefix and reports
+// the number of bytes actually consumed alongside ErrInflatedSizeMismatch,
+// matching the contract in io.Writer. A write error from the underlying
+// writer during overrun-handling is joined with ErrInflatedSizeMismatch so
+// it is not silently dropped.
+func (b *boundedWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
+	if b.n+int64(len(p)) > b.limit {
+		remain := int(b.limit - b.n)
+		err := error(ErrInflatedSizeMismatch)
+		if remain > 0 {
+			n, werr := b.w.Write(p[:remain])
+			b.n += int64(n)
+			if werr != nil {
+				err = errors.Join(ErrInflatedSizeMismatch, werr)
+			}
+			return n, err
+		}
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	n, err := b.w.Write(p)
+	b.n += int64(n)
+	return n, err
+}
+
+// boundedReadCloser wraps a ReadCloser and reports ErrInflatedSizeMismatch
+// once more than limit bytes have been read. It is used by the on-demand
+// object reader returned from FSObject.Reader so that a lazy Read of a
+// packfile object cannot stream past its declared inflated size.
+//
+// The implementation builds on io.LimitedReader with the standard
+// overrun-detection trick: request limit+1 bytes from the underlying so
+// that the moment the sentinel byte materializes (LimitedReader.N drops
+// to zero) we know the source produced more than limit bytes.
+type boundedReadCloser struct {
+	lr      io.LimitedReader
+	closer  io.Closer
+	overrun bool
+}
+
+// newBoundedReadCloser wraps rc so that the cumulative bytes returned from
+// Read never exceed limit. The first call that would have returned a byte
+// past limit instead returns ErrInflatedSizeMismatch; subsequent calls
+// keep returning the same error. A negative limit is treated as zero, so
+// the first byte produced by rc surfaces ErrInflatedSizeMismatch.
+func newBoundedReadCloser(rc io.ReadCloser, limit int64) *boundedReadCloser {
+	if limit < 0 {
+		limit = 0
+	}
+	return &boundedReadCloser{
+		lr:     io.LimitedReader{R: rc, N: limit + 1},
+		closer: rc,
+	}
+}
+
+// Read forwards Read up to the configured byte limit. When the underlying
+// stream produces the limit+1 sentinel byte, the legal prefix is returned
+// alongside ErrInflatedSizeMismatch; on subsequent calls only the error
+// is returned.
+func (b *boundedReadCloser) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
+	if b.overrun {
+		return 0, ErrInflatedSizeMismatch
+	}
+	n, err := b.lr.Read(p)
+	if b.lr.N == 0 {
+		b.overrun = true
+		return n - 1, ErrInflatedSizeMismatch
+	}
+	return n, err
+}
+
+// Close closes the underlying ReadCloser.
+func (b *boundedReadCloser) Close() error { return b.closer.Close() }
+
 // ObjectHeader contains the information related to the object, this information
 // is collected from the previous bytes to the content of the object.
 type ObjectHeader struct {
@@ -220,6 +312,13 @@ func (s *Scanner) nextObjectHeader() (*ObjectHeader, error) {
 			return nil, err
 		}
 
+		// An OFS-delta references a base object that appears earlier
+		// in the pack; the negative offset must be strictly positive
+		// and not larger than the current object's offset.
+		if no <= 0 || no > h.Offset {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid OFS delta offset", ErrMalformedPackFile)
+		}
+
 		h.OffsetReference = h.Offset - no
 	case plumbing.REFDeltaObject:
 		var err error
@@ -303,6 +402,13 @@ func (s *Scanner) readLength(first byte) (int64, error) {
 	shift := firstLengthBits
 	var err error
 	for c&maskContinue > 0 {
+		// Mirrors unpack_object_header_buffer in canonical Git's
+		// packfile.c: a continuation byte at shift > 64-7 cannot
+		// contribute without overflowing an int64.
+		if shift > 64-lengthBits {
+			return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrMalformedPackFile, ErrLengthOverflow)
+		}
+
 		if c, err = s.r.ReadByte(); err != nil {
 			return 0, err
 		}
@@ -315,10 +421,18 @@ func (s *Scanner) readLength(first byte) (int64, error) {
 }
 
 // NextObject writes the content of the next object into the reader, returns
-// the number of bytes written, the CRC32 of the content and an error, if any
+// the number of bytes written, the CRC32 of the content and an error, if any.
+//
+// When a prior NextObjectHeader has stashed the object header in
+// pendingObject, the inflated stream is bounded by the header's declared
+// length and surfaces ErrInflatedSizeMismatch on overrun.
 func (s *Scanner) NextObject(w io.Writer) (written int64, crc32 uint32, err error) {
+	declaredSize := int64(-1)
+	if s.pendingObject != nil {
+		declaredSize = s.pendingObject.Length
+	}
 	s.pendingObject = nil
-	written, err = s.copyObject(w)
+	written, err = s.copyObject(w, declaredSize)
 
 	s.r.Flush()
 	crc32 = s.crc.Sum32()
@@ -327,23 +441,39 @@ func (s *Scanner) NextObject(w io.Writer) (written int64, crc32 uint32, err erro
 	return
 }
 
-// ReadObject returns a reader for the object content and an error
+// ReadObject returns a reader for the object content and an error.
+//
+// When a prior NextObjectHeader has stashed the object header in
+// pendingObject, the returned reader is bounded by the header's declared
+// length so callers cannot stream past the declared inflated size; an
+// overrun surfaces ErrInflatedSizeMismatch on the byte just past the
+// limit.
 func (s *Scanner) ReadObject() (io.ReadCloser, error) {
+	declaredSize := int64(-1)
+	if s.pendingObject != nil {
+		declaredSize = s.pendingObject.Length
+	}
 	s.pendingObject = nil
 	zr, err := sync.GetZlibReader(s.r)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("zlib reset error: %s", err)
 	}
 
-	return ioutil.NewReadCloserWithCloser(zr.Reader, func() error {
+	rc := ioutil.NewReadCloserWithCloser(zr.Reader, func() error {
 		sync.PutZlibReader(zr)
 		return nil
-	}), nil
+	})
+	if declaredSize >= 0 {
+		return newBoundedReadCloser(rc, declaredSize), nil
+	}
+	return rc, nil
 }
 
-// ReadRegularObject reads and write a non-deltified object
-// from it zlib stream in an object entry in the packfile.
-func (s *Scanner) copyObject(w io.Writer) (n int64, err error) {
+// copyObject inflates a non-deltified object's zlib stream into w. When
+// declaredSize is non-negative, the write sink is wrapped in a
+// boundedWriter so an overrun surfaces ErrInflatedSizeMismatch instead
+// of being silently appended.
+func (s *Scanner) copyObject(w io.Writer, declaredSize int64) (n int64, err error) {
 	zr, err := sync.GetZlibReader(s.r)
 	defer sync.PutZlibReader(zr)
 
@@ -352,8 +482,14 @@ func (s *Scanner) copyObject(w io.Writer) (n int64, err error) {
 	}
 
 	defer ioutil.CheckClose(zr.Reader, &err)
+
+	sink := w
+	if declaredSize >= 0 {
+		sink = &boundedWriter{w: w, limit: declaredSize}
+	}
+
 	buf := sync.GetByteSlice()
-	n, err = io.CopyBuffer(w, zr.Reader, *buf)
+	n, err = io.CopyBuffer(sink, zr.Reader, *buf)
 	sync.PutByteSlice(buf)
 	return
 }

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing/object/tree.go

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
 	"sort"
 	"strings"
 
+	"github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/internal/pathutil"
 	"github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing"
 	"github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing/filemode"
 	"github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing/storer"
@@ -118,7 +119,16 @@ func (t *Tree) Tree(path string) (*Tree, error) {
 }
 
 // TreeEntryFile returns the *File for a given *TreeEntry.
+//
+// The entry's name is validated against pathutil.ValidTreePath for
+// the same reason FindEntry validates: TreeEntryFile is a boundary
+// where attacker-controlled tree data leaves the trusted store as a
+// *File whose Name a caller can hand to filesystem ops.
 func (t *Tree) TreeEntryFile(e *TreeEntry) (*File, error) {
+	if err := pathutil.ValidTreePath(e.Name); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
 	blob, err := GetBlob(t.s, e.Hash)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -128,7 +138,16 @@ func (t *Tree) TreeEntryFile(e *TreeEntry) (*File, error) {
 }
 
 // FindEntry search a TreeEntry in this tree or any subtree.
+//
+// The lookup path is validated against pathutil.ValidTreePath to
+// prevent attacker-controlled tree contents from leaking past this
+// boundary as `.git`-shaped or path-traversal-shaped names. Callers
+// that legitimately need to look up unsafe paths should walk the
+// tree manually.
 func (t *Tree) FindEntry(path string) (*TreeEntry, error) {
+	if err := pathutil.ValidTreePath(path); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
 	if t.t == nil {
 		t.t = make(map[string]*Tree)
 	}
@@ -517,6 +536,10 @@ func (w *TreeWalker) Next() (name string, entry TreeEntry, err error) {
 			continue
 		}
 
+		if err := pathutil.ValidTreePath(entry.Name); err != nil {
+			return name, entry, err
+		}
+
 		if entry.Mode == filemode.Dir {
 			obj, err = GetTree(w.s, entry.Hash)
 		}

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing/transport/ssh/common.go

@@ -252,7 +252,39 @@ func (c *command) setAuthFromEndpoint() error {
 }
 
 func endpointToCommand(cmd string, ep *transport.Endpoint) string {
-	return fmt.Sprintf("%s '%s'", cmd, ep.Path)
+	var b strings.Builder
+	b.WriteString(cmd)
+	b.WriteByte(' ')
+	writeShellQuote(&b, ep.Path)
+	return b.String()
+}
+
+// writeShellQuote writes s to b, wrapped in single quotes with
+// embedded single quotes and exclamation marks escaped using the
+// POSIX close-escape-reopen idiom:
+//
+//	' becomes '\''
+//	! becomes '\!'
+//
+// It is a direct port of canonical Git's sq_quote_buf (quote.c).
+// The bang escape keeps the result safe when re-evaluated under
+// csh-derived shells that perform history expansion. The output is
+// safe to pass as a single argument through any POSIX shell and
+// round-trips through git-shell's sq_dequote_to_argv.
+func writeShellQuote(b *strings.Builder, s string) {
+	b.Grow(len(s) + 2)
+	b.WriteByte('\'')
+	for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
+		c := s[i]
+		if c == '\'' || c == '!' {
+			b.WriteString(`'\`)
+			b.WriteByte(c)
+			b.WriteByte('\'')
+			continue
+		}
+		b.WriteByte(c)
+	}
+	b.WriteByte('\'')
 }
 
 func overrideConfig(overrides *ssh.ClientConfig, c *ssh.ClientConfig) {

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/repository.go

@@ -1530,7 +1530,18 @@ func (r *Repository) Worktree() (*Worktree, error) {
 		return nil, ErrIsBareRepository
 	}
 
-	return &Worktree{r: r, Filesystem: r.wt}, nil
+	protectNTFS := defaultProtectNTFS()
+	protectHFS := defaultProtectHFS()
+	if cfg, err := r.Config(); err == nil {
+		if cfg.Core.ProtectNTFS.IsSet() {
+			protectNTFS = cfg.Core.ProtectNTFS.IsTrue()
+		}
+		if cfg.Core.ProtectHFS.IsSet() {
+			protectHFS = cfg.Core.ProtectHFS.IsTrue()
+		}
+	}
+
+	return &Worktree{r: r, Filesystem: newWorktreeFilesystem(r.wt, protectNTFS, protectHFS)}, nil
 }
 
 func expand_ref(s storer.ReferenceStorer, ref plumbing.ReferenceName) (*plumbing.Reference, error) {

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/storage/filesystem/dotgit/dotgit.go

@@ -75,6 +75,10 @@ var (
 	// ErrEmptyRefFile is returned when a reference file is attempted to be read,
 	// but the file is empty
 	ErrEmptyRefFile = errors.New("ref file is empty")
+	// ErrModuleNameEscape is returned when a submodule name would
+	// resolve outside the modules/ subtree, mirroring canonical Git's
+	// "ignoring suspicious submodule name" defence.
+	ErrModuleNameEscape = errors.New("submodule name escapes modules/ directory")
 )
 
 // Options holds configuration for the storage.
@@ -1127,9 +1131,20 @@ func (d *DotGit) PackRefs() (err error) {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// Module return a billy.Filesystem pointing to the module folder
+// Module returns a billy.Filesystem pointing to the module folder.
+//
+// As a defence in depth against submodule name path traversal,
+// refuse names whose joined path leaves the modules/ subtree once
+// cleaned. The config-layer parser also validates submodule names,
+// but Module may be reached from any caller that constructs a
+// Submodule struct programmatically and so bypasses the parser.
 func (d *DotGit) Module(name string) (billy.Filesystem, error) {
-	return d.fs.Chroot(d.fs.Join(modulePath, name))
+	p := d.fs.Join(modulePath, name)
+	cleaned := path.Clean(filepath.ToSlash(p))
+	if cleaned != modulePath && !strings.HasPrefix(cleaned, modulePath+"/") {
+		return nil, ErrModuleNameEscape
+	}
+	return d.fs.Chroot(p)
 }
 
 func (d *DotGit) AddAlternate(remote string) error {

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/submodule.go

@@ -6,9 +6,12 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"path"
+	"path/filepath"
 
 	"github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5"
 	"github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/config"
+	"github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/internal/pathutil"
+	giturl "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/internal/url"
 	"github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing"
 	"github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing/format/index"
 	"github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing/transport"
@@ -119,6 +122,16 @@ func (s *Submodule) Repository() (*Repository, error) {
 		exists = true
 	}
 
+	// s.c.Path is sourced from the worktree's .gitmodules and is
+	// therefore tree-controlled. Apply the strict tree-path validator
+	// before chroot — the wrapper's tolerant validPath would let a
+	// final-position .git component through (e.g. "submodule/.git"),
+	// which a malicious .gitmodules could use to chroot the submodule
+	// worktree into the repository's actual .git directory.
+	if err := pathutil.ValidTreePath(s.c.Path); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
 	var worktree billy.Filesystem
 	if worktree, err = s.w.Filesystem.Chroot(s.c.Path); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -138,18 +151,25 @@ func (s *Submodule) Repository() (*Repository, error) {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	if !path.IsAbs(moduleEndpoint.Path) && moduleEndpoint.Protocol == "file" {
-		remotes, err := s.w.r.Remotes()
+	// A relative submodule URL such as "../X.git" must resolve against
+	// the parent repository's remote URL, not against the process CWD.
+	// Detect relativity from the raw configured URL because
+	// transport.NewEndpoint normalizes local paths to absolute form via
+	// filepath.Abs, which would otherwise mask the relative form here.
+	if giturl.IsLocalEndpoint(s.c.URL) &&
+		!path.IsAbs(s.c.URL) && !filepath.IsAbs(s.c.URL) {
+
+		base, err := defaultRemote(s.w.r)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("resolving relative submodule URL: %w", err)
+		}
+
+		rootEndpoint, err := transport.NewEndpoint(base.URLs[0])
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, err
 		}
 
-		rootEndpoint, err := transport.NewEndpoint(remotes[0].c.URLs[0])
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-
-		rootEndpoint.Path = path.Join(rootEndpoint.Path, moduleEndpoint.Path)
+		rootEndpoint.Path = path.Join(rootEndpoint.Path, s.c.URL)
 		*moduleEndpoint = *rootEndpoint
 	}
 
@@ -161,6 +181,52 @@ func (s *Submodule) Repository() (*Repository, error) {
 	return r, err
 }
 
+// defaultRemote returns the remote that relative submodule URLs are
+// resolved against, mirroring canonical Git's repo_default_remote
+// (remote.c) and resolve_relative_url (builtin/submodule--helper.c):
+//
+//  1. if HEAD is on a branch with branch.<name>.remote configured,
+//     use that remote;
+//  2. else if exactly one remote is configured, use it;
+//  3. otherwise fall back to DefaultRemoteName ("origin").
+//
+// Each rule falls through unconditionally: a branch lookup that
+// finds the branch but with an empty Remote does not short-circuit
+// rule (2). Returns an error when the chosen remote is not configured.
+func defaultRemote(r *Repository) (*config.RemoteConfig, error) {
+	cfg, err := r.Config()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	if ref, err := r.Reference(plumbing.HEAD, false); err == nil &&
+		ref.Type() == plumbing.SymbolicReference &&
+		ref.Target().IsBranch() {
+		if b, ok := cfg.Branches[ref.Target().Short()]; ok && b.Remote != "" {
+			return lookupRemote(cfg, b.Remote)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if len(cfg.Remotes) == 1 {
+		for name := range cfg.Remotes {
+			return lookupRemote(cfg, name)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return lookupRemote(cfg, DefaultRemoteName)
+}
+
+func lookupRemote(cfg *config.Config, name string) (*config.RemoteConfig, error) {
+	rc, ok := cfg.Remotes[name]
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("remote %q not found", name)
+	}
+	if len(rc.URLs) == 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("remote %q has no configured URL", name)
+	}
+	return rc, nil
+}
+
 // Update the registered submodule to match what the superproject expects, the
 // submodule should be initialized first calling the Init method or setting in
 // the options SubmoduleUpdateOptions.Init equals true

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/utils/binary/read.go

@@ -5,11 +5,18 @@ package binary
 import (
 	"bufio"
 	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
 	"io"
+	"math"
 
 	"github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing"
 )
 
+// ErrIntegerOverflow is returned when a Git-format variable-width integer
+// would not fit into an int64 because the input declares more continuation
+// bytes than the type can hold.
+var ErrIntegerOverflow = errors.New("variable-width integer overflow")
+
 // Read reads structured binary data from r into data. Bytes are read and
 // decoded in BigEndian order
 // https://golang.org/pkg/encoding/binary/#Read
@@ -92,6 +99,14 @@ func ReadVariableWidthInt(r io.Reader) (int64, error) {
 
 	var v = int64(c & maskLength)
 	for c&maskContinue > 0 {
+		// Reject input that, after the v++ and shift below, would
+		// not fit in an int64. With v < (MaxInt64-127)>>7, the
+		// post-increment v is at most (MaxInt64-127)>>7 and the
+		// final (v << 7) + (c & 0x7F) stays within int64.
+		if v >= (math.MaxInt64-int64(maskLength))>>lengthBits {
+			return 0, ErrIntegerOverflow
+		}
+
 		v++
 		if err := Read(r, &c); err != nil {
 			return 0, err

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/worktree.go

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
 	"io"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
-	"runtime"
 	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5"
@@ -458,10 +457,6 @@ func (w *Worktree) resetWorktree(t *object.Tree, files []string) error {
 
 	filesMap := buildFilePathMap(files)
 	for _, ch := range changes {
-		if err := w.validChange(ch); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-
 		if len(files) > 0 {
 			file := ""
 			if ch.From != nil {
@@ -489,108 +484,6 @@ func (w *Worktree) resetWorktree(t *object.Tree, files []string) error {
 	return w.r.Storer.SetIndex(idx)
 }
 
-// worktreeDeny is a list of paths that are not allowed
-// to be used when resetting the worktree.
-var worktreeDeny = map[string]struct{}{
-	// .git
-	GitDirName: {},
-
-	// For other historical reasons, file names that do not conform to the 8.3
-	// format (up to eight characters for the basename, three for the file
-	// extension, certain characters not allowed such as `+`, etc) are associated
-	// with a so-called "short name", at least on the `C:` drive by default.
-	// Which means that `git~1/` is a valid way to refer to `.git/`.
-	"git~1": {},
-}
-
-// validPath checks whether paths are valid.
-// The rules around invalid paths could differ from upstream based on how
-// filesystems are managed within go-git, but they are largely the same.
-//
-// For upstream rules:
-// https://github.com/git/git/blob/564d0252ca632e0264ed670534a51d18a689ef5d/read-cache.c#L946
-// https://github.com/git/git/blob/564d0252ca632e0264ed670534a51d18a689ef5d/path.c#L1383
-func validPath(paths ...string) error {
-	for _, p := range paths {
-		parts := strings.FieldsFunc(p, func(r rune) bool { return (r == '\\' || r == '/') })
-		if len(parts) == 0 {
-			return fmt.Errorf("invalid path: %q", p)
-		}
-
-		if _, denied := worktreeDeny[strings.ToLower(parts[0])]; denied {
-			return fmt.Errorf("invalid path prefix: %q", p)
-		}
-
-		if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
-			// Volume names are not supported, in both formats: \\ and <DRIVE_LETTER>:.
-			if vol := filepath.VolumeName(p); vol != "" {
-				return fmt.Errorf("invalid path: %q", p)
-			}
-
-			if !windowsValidPath(parts[0]) {
-				return fmt.Errorf("invalid path: %q", p)
-			}
-		}
-
-		for _, part := range parts {
-			if part == ".." {
-				return fmt.Errorf("invalid path %q: cannot use '..'", p)
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// windowsPathReplacer defines the chars that need to be replaced
-// as part of windowsValidPath.
-var windowsPathReplacer *strings.Replacer
-
-func init() {
-	windowsPathReplacer = strings.NewReplacer(" ", "", ".", "")
-}
-
-func windowsValidPath(part string) bool {
-	if len(part) > 3 && strings.EqualFold(part[:4], GitDirName) {
-		// For historical reasons, file names that end in spaces or periods are
-		// automatically trimmed. Therefore, `.git . . ./` is a valid way to refer
-		// to `.git/`.
-		if windowsPathReplacer.Replace(part[4:]) == "" {
-			return false
-		}
-
-		// For yet other historical reasons, NTFS supports so-called "Alternate Data
-		// Streams", i.e. metadata associated with a given file, referred to via
-		// `<filename>:<stream-name>:<stream-type>`. There exists a default stream
-		// type for directories, allowing `.git/` to be accessed via
-		// `.git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/`.
-		//
-		// For performance reasons, _all_ Alternate Data Streams of `.git/` are
-		// forbidden, not just `::$INDEX_ALLOCATION`.
-		if len(part) > 4 && part[4:5] == ":" {
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-func (w *Worktree) validChange(ch merkletrie.Change) error {
-	action, err := ch.Action()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	switch action {
-	case merkletrie.Delete:
-		return validPath(ch.From.String())
-	case merkletrie.Insert:
-		return validPath(ch.To.String())
-	case merkletrie.Modify:
-		return validPath(ch.From.String(), ch.To.String())
-	}
-
-	return nil
-}
-
 func (w *Worktree) checkoutChange(ch merkletrie.Change, t *object.Tree, idx *indexBuilder) error {
 	a, err := ch.Action()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -763,10 +656,10 @@ func (w *Worktree) checkoutFile(f *object.File) (err error) {
 }
 
 func (w *Worktree) checkoutFileSymlink(f *object.File) (err error) {
-	// https://github.com/git/git/commit/10ecfa76491e4923988337b2e2243b05376b40de
-	if strings.EqualFold(f.Name, gitmodulesFile) {
-		return ErrGitModulesSymlink
-	}
+	// .gitmodules symlink rejection (and its NTFS / HFS variants) is
+	// enforced by the worktreeFilesystem wrapper's Symlink method via
+	// validSymlinkName. See https://github.com/git/git/commit/10ecfa7
+	// for the upstream rationale.
 
 	from, err := f.Reader()
 	if err != nil {

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/worktree_fs.go

@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+package git
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"runtime"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5"
+
+	"github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/internal/pathutil"
+)
+
+// defaultProtectHFS returns the default value for core.protectHFS
+// when not explicitly configured. Matches upstream Git's
+// PROTECT_HFS_DEFAULT[1], which the Makefile sets to 1 on Darwin
+// and leaves at 0 on every other platform.
+//
+// [1]: https://github.com/git/git/blob/v2.54.0/config.mak.uname#L146
+func defaultProtectHFS() bool {
+	return runtime.GOOS == "darwin"
+}
+
+// defaultProtectNTFS returns the default value for core.protectNTFS
+// when not explicitly configured. Matches upstream Git's
+// PROTECT_NTFS_DEFAULT, which has been 1 on every platform since
+// 9102f958ee5 (CVE-2019-1353)[1]: WSL allows Linux processes to
+// reach NTFS-mounted worktrees on Windows hosts, so the
+// is_ntfs_dotgit guard cannot safely be gated on the runtime OS.
+//
+// [1]: https://github.com/git/git/commit/9102f958ee5
+func defaultProtectNTFS() bool {
+	return true
+}
+
+// worktreeFilesystem wraps a billy.Filesystem and validates every path passed
+// to a mutating operation. This prevents writing to, or deleting from,
+// dangerous locations (e.g. .git/*, ../) regardless of which worktree
+// code path triggers the operation.
+type worktreeFilesystem struct {
+	billy.Filesystem
+	protectNTFS bool
+	protectHFS  bool
+}
+
+func newWorktreeFilesystem(fs billy.Filesystem, protectNTFS, protectHFS bool) *worktreeFilesystem {
+	return &worktreeFilesystem{Filesystem: fs, protectNTFS: protectNTFS, protectHFS: protectHFS}
+}
+
+func (sfs *worktreeFilesystem) Create(filename string) (billy.File, error) {
+	if err := sfs.validPath(filename); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("create: %w", err)
+	}
+	return sfs.Filesystem.Create(filename)
+}
+
+func (sfs *worktreeFilesystem) Open(filename string) (billy.File, error) {
+	if err := sfs.validReadPath(filename); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("open: %w", err)
+	}
+	return sfs.Filesystem.Open(filename)
+}
+
+func (sfs *worktreeFilesystem) OpenFile(filename string, flag int, perm os.FileMode) (billy.File, error) {
+	if err := sfs.validPath(filename); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("openfile: %w", err)
+	}
+	return sfs.Filesystem.OpenFile(filename, flag, perm)
+}
+
+func (sfs *worktreeFilesystem) Stat(filename string) (os.FileInfo, error) {
+	if err := sfs.validReadPath(filename); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("stat: %w", err)
+	}
+	return sfs.Filesystem.Stat(filename)
+}
+
+func (sfs *worktreeFilesystem) Remove(filename string) error {
+	if err := sfs.validPath(filename); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("remove: %w", err)
+	}
+	return sfs.Filesystem.Remove(filename)
+}
+
+func (sfs *worktreeFilesystem) Rename(from, to string) error {
+	if err := sfs.validPath(from, to); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("rename: %w", err)
+	}
+	return sfs.Filesystem.Rename(from, to)
+}
+
+func (sfs *worktreeFilesystem) ReadDir(path string) ([]os.FileInfo, error) {
+	if err := sfs.validReadPath(path); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("readdir: %w", err)
+	}
+	return sfs.Filesystem.ReadDir(path)
+}
+
+func (sfs *worktreeFilesystem) Lstat(filename string) (os.FileInfo, error) {
+	if err := sfs.validReadPath(filename); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("lstat: %w", err)
+	}
+	return sfs.Filesystem.Lstat(filename)
+}
+
+func (sfs *worktreeFilesystem) Symlink(target, link string) error {
+	if err := sfs.validPath(link); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("symlink: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := sfs.validSymlinkName(link); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("symlink: %w", err)
+	}
+	return sfs.Filesystem.Symlink(target, link)
+}
+
+func (sfs *worktreeFilesystem) Readlink(link string) (string, error) {
+	if err := sfs.validReadPath(link); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("readlink: %w", err)
+	}
+	return sfs.Filesystem.Readlink(link)
+}
+
+func (sfs *worktreeFilesystem) MkdirAll(path string, perm os.FileMode) error {
+	// MkdirAll on the worktree root is a no-op: the root always exists,
+	// so there is nothing to materialise. Mirroring the tolerance that
+	// validReadPath gives to read-side operations avoids breaking callers
+	// that walk a directory tree and pass the relative-to-root prefix
+	// ("") through to the worktree FS.
+	if path == "" || path == "." || path == "/" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if err := sfs.validPath(path); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("mkdirall: %w", err)
+	}
+	return sfs.Filesystem.MkdirAll(path, perm)
+}
+
+func (sfs *worktreeFilesystem) TempFile(_, _ string) (billy.File, error) {
+	return nil, fmt.Errorf("tempfile: %w", errUnsupportedOperation)
+}
+
+func (sfs *worktreeFilesystem) Chroot(path string) (billy.Filesystem, error) {
+	if err := sfs.validReadPath(path); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("chroot: %w", err)
+	}
+	return sfs.Filesystem.Chroot(path)
+}
+
+// validReadPath is like validPath but treats the empty string and "." as
+// valid references to the worktree root. Read-side operations on the root
+// (e.g. ReadDir(""), Lstat(".")) are legitimate; mutating the root itself
+// is not, so write-side operations continue to use validPath directly.
+func (sfs *worktreeFilesystem) validReadPath(p string) error {
+	if p == "" || p == "." || p == "/" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return sfs.validPath(p)
+}
+
+var errUnsupportedOperation = errors.New("unsupported operation")
+
+// isDotGitVariant reports whether part is .git, git~1, or an HFS+
+// equivalent of .git (when protectHFS is true). NTFS variants of .git
+// (e.g. ".git " with trailing space, ".git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION") are
+// detected separately by pathutil.WindowsValidPath, which applies
+// regardless of position in the path. Both validators reuse this
+// helper.
+func isDotGitVariant(part string, protectHFS bool) bool {
+	if pathutil.IsDotGitName(part) {
+		return true
+	}
+	if protectHFS && pathutil.IsHFSDotGit(part) {
+		return true
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// validPath checks whether paths are valid for the worktree
+// filesystem abstraction. It is intentionally tolerant of .git as
+// the final path component of a multi-component path
+// (e.g. "submodule/.git"), so that legitimate gitlink pointer files
+// can still be Stat'd, Read, and Removed via the wrapper during
+// submodule cleanup. Attacker-controlled tree-entry paths are
+// validated separately by pathutil.ValidTreePath at the boundaries
+// where data leaves the trusted store (Tree.FindEntry, the explicit
+// callers in CherryPick and Submodule.Repository).
+//
+// For upstream rules:
+// https://github.com/git/git/blob/v2.54.0/read-cache.c#L987
+// https://github.com/git/git/blob/v2.54.0/path.c#L1419
+func (sfs *worktreeFilesystem) validPath(paths ...string) error {
+	for _, p := range paths {
+		for i := 0; i < len(p); i++ {
+			if p[i] < 0x20 || p[i] == 0x7f {
+				return fmt.Errorf("invalid path %q: contains control character", p)
+			}
+		}
+
+		parts := strings.FieldsFunc(p, func(r rune) bool { return (r == '\\' || r == '/') })
+		if len(parts) == 0 {
+			return fmt.Errorf("invalid path: %q", p)
+		}
+
+		if sfs.protectNTFS {
+			// Volume names are not supported, in both formats: \\ and <DRIVE_LETTER>:.
+			if vol := filepath.VolumeName(p); vol != "" {
+				return fmt.Errorf("invalid path: %q", p)
+			}
+		}
+
+		for i, part := range parts {
+			if part == "." || part == ".." {
+				return fmt.Errorf("invalid path %q: cannot use %q", p, part)
+			}
+
+			// Reject .git (and equivalents) as a path component when it is
+			// either the first component (root-level .git) or a non-final
+			// component (traversal into a .git directory, e.g. "a/.git/config").
+			// A final non-first .git component (e.g. "submodule/.git") is
+			// allowed because submodule worktrees contain a .git pointer file.
+			if isDotGitVariant(part, sfs.protectHFS) && (i == 0 || i < len(parts)-1) {
+				return fmt.Errorf("invalid path component: %q", p)
+			}
+
+			if sfs.protectNTFS && !pathutil.WindowsValidPath(part) {
+				return fmt.Errorf("invalid path: %q", p)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// validSymlinkName checks the per-component name of a symlink for
+// dotfile names that attackers can use to trick a checkout into
+// writing a dangerous symlink. Each path component is compared
+// against .gitmodules case-insensitively, against its NTFS variants
+// (e.g. ".gitmodules .", ".gitmodules::$INDEX_ALLOCATION", or 8.3
+// short-name forms) when protectNTFS is on, and against its HFS+
+// variants (Unicode ignored code points folded into ".gitmodules")
+// when protectHFS is on.
+//
+// Reference: upstream Git verify_path_internal at read-cache.c#L1004-L1024
+// in tag v2.54.0[1].
+//
+// [1]: https://github.com/git/git/blob/v2.54.0/read-cache.c#L1004-L1024
+func (sfs *worktreeFilesystem) validSymlinkName(name string) error {
+	parts := strings.FieldsFunc(name, func(r rune) bool {
+		return r == '/' || r == '\\'
+	})
+	for _, part := range parts {
+		if strings.EqualFold(part, gitmodulesFile) {
+			return ErrGitModulesSymlink
+		}
+		if sfs.protectNTFS && pathutil.IsNTFSDotGitmodules(part) {
+			return ErrGitModulesSymlink
+		}
+		if sfs.protectHFS && pathutil.IsHFSDotGitmodules(part) {
+			return ErrGitModulesSymlink
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}

vendor/github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/worktree_status.go

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5/util"
+	"github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/internal/pathutil"
 	"github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing"
 	"github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing/filemode"
 	"github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing/format/gitignore"
@@ -545,6 +546,14 @@ func (w *Worktree) addOrUpdateFileToIndex(idx *index.Index, filename string, h p
 }
 
 func (w *Worktree) doAddFileToIndex(idx *index.Index, filename string, h plumbing.Hash) error {
+	// Mirror upstream's Index.Add gate at the v5 caller boundary: the
+	// index feeds future trees, so a name that the tree-side
+	// pathutil.ValidTreePath gate would reject must not enter the
+	// index in the first place. v5 keeps Index.Add's existing signature
+	// for API compatibility, so the validation happens here.
+	if err := pathutil.ValidTreePath(filename); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	return w.doUpdateFileToIndex(idx.Add(filename), filename, h)
 }
 

vendor/github.com/pjbgf/sha1cd/Dockerfile.arm

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-FROM golang:1.26@sha256:313faae491b410a35402c05d35e7518ae99103d957308e940e1ae2cfa0aac29b
+FROM golang:1.25@sha256:31c1e53dfc1cc2d269deec9c83f58729fa3c53dc9a576f6426109d1e319e9e9a
 
 ENV GOOS=linux
 ENV GOARCH=arm

vendor/github.com/pjbgf/sha1cd/Dockerfile.arm64

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-FROM golang:1.26@sha256:313faae491b410a35402c05d35e7518ae99103d957308e940e1ae2cfa0aac29b
+FROM golang:1.25@sha256:31c1e53dfc1cc2d269deec9c83f58729fa3c53dc9a576f6426109d1e319e9e9a
 
 ENV GOOS=linux
 ENV GOARCH=arm64

vendor/modules.txt

@@ -291,11 +291,12 @@ github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5/helper/polyfill
 github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5/memfs
 github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5/osfs
 github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5/util
-# github.com/go-git/go-git/v5 v5.19.0
+# github.com/go-git/go-git/v5 v5.19.1
 ## explicit; go 1.25.0
 github.com/go-git/go-git/v5
 github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/config
 github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/internal/path_util
+github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/internal/pathutil
 github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/internal/revision
 github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/internal/url
 github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing