While the module proxy can speed up vendoring, it may cause issues when
(temporarily) vendoring from a fork, because the proxy may not have the
module yet on first try, which causes vendoring to fail:
vendor.mod:95:2: replace github.com/thaJeztah/compose-on-kubernetes:
version "0b59cf047b3b0199048fe13fdcd21b0cb46549f2" invalid:
Get "0b59cf047b.info": read tcp 172.17.0.2:60290->172.217.168.209:443: read: connection reset by peer
Using `GOPROXY=direct` to fetch sources directly from upstream (GitHub) instead.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
There was some debate about this, and wether or not tidy should be run
when vendoring, but without this, validation failed after running
`make vendor`, and manually doing a `go mod tidy` is complicated
(due to the `vendor.mod`, and because the cache is not inside the
build-cache, not on the host).
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
> Legacy PEM encryption as specified in RFC 1423 is insecure by design. Since
> it does not authenticate the ciphertext, it is vulnerable to padding oracle
> attacks that can let an attacker recover the plaintext
From https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/264159
> It's unfortunate that we don't implement PKCS#8 encryption so we can't
> recommend an alternative but PEM encryption is so broken that it's worth
> deprecating outright.
This feature allowed using an encrypted private key with a supplied password,
but did not provide additional security as the encryption is known to be broken,
and the key is sitting next to the password in the filesystem. Users are recommended
to decrypt the private key, and store it un-encrypted to continue using it.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Change the order of received/written and sent/read in NET I/O and BLOCK I/O description reflect the order in I/O (Input/Output).
From example above:
CONTAINER NAME: awesome_brattain
BLOCK I/O: 147kB / 0B
awesome_brattain has written 147kB and read 0B
Signed-off-by: Tomas Bäckman <larstomas@gmail.com>
Ubuntu version references were a mixture of 14.04 (in descriptions) and 20.04 (in example code). Updated description references to 20.04 to match example code.
Signed-off-by: Mike Dalton <mikedalton@github.com>
This adds a Windows TERM signal which makes propagation of termination to containers work properly.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Champlon <mathieu.champlon@docker.com>
go1.16.10 (released 2021-11-04) includes security fixes to the archive/zip and
debug/macho packages, as well as bug fixes to the compiler, linker, runtime, the
misc/wasm directory, and to the net/http package. See the Go 1.16.10 milestone
for details: https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.16.10+label%3ACherryPickApproved
From the announcement e-mail:
[security] Go 1.17.3 and Go 1.16.10 are released
We have just released Go versions 1.17.3 and 1.16.10, minor point releases.
These minor releases include two security fixes following the security policy:
- archive/zip: don't panic on (*Reader).Open
Reader.Open (the API implementing io/fs.FS introduced in Go 1.16) can be made
to panic by an attacker providing either a crafted ZIP archive containing
completely invalid names or an empty filename argument.
Thank you to Colin Arnott, SiteHost and Noah Santschi-Cooney, Sourcegraph Code
Intelligence Team for reporting this issue. This is CVE-2021-41772 and Go issue
golang.org/issue/48085.
- debug/macho: invalid dynamic symbol table command can cause panic
Malformed binaries parsed using Open or OpenFat can cause a panic when calling
ImportedSymbols, due to an out-of-bounds slice operation.
Thanks to Burak Çarıkçı - Yunus Yıldırım (CT-Zer0 Crypttech) for reporting this
issue. This is CVE-2021-41771 and Go issue golang.org/issue/48990.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
