- Replace gorilla/csrf with net/http CrossOriginProtection - Require valkey-password and add TLS options for session store - End session at /logout and revoke refresh tokens - Re-derive identity and roles from provider every five minutes - Process each Stripe webhook event in its own Temporal workflow - Give each outbox entry its own workflow with Temporal retries - Guard against stale Stripe events with provider timestamps - Derive transport security from base-url scheme
115 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
115 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only OR LicenseRef-Commercial
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// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2025-2026 Christian Galo
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package middleware
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import (
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"net/http"
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"git.coopcloud.tech/wiki-cafe/member-console/internal/config"
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)
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// hstsValue is the Strict-Transport-Security policy sent over https: one
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// year, subdomains included, no preload.
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const hstsValue = "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
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// SecurityHeaders adds security and cache-control headers to all responses
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func SecureHeaders() Middleware {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// Caching headers
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w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
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// XSSProtection provides protection against cross-site scripting attack (XSS)
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w.Header().Set("X-XSS-Protection", "1; mode=block")
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// ContentTypeNosniff provides protection against overriding Content-Type
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w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
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// XFrameOptions prevents the page from being displayed in a frame
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w.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
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// HSTS, only where the console is served over https. RFC 6797
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// section 7.2 forbids sending it over non-secure transport
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// (browsers ignore it there anyway, section 8.1). The year is
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// the standard value: a shorter one re-opens the first-request
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// window every time a visitor is away longer than it (section
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// 11.2). includeSubDomains covers subdomains of the console's
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// own host, which nothing else uses, and closes cookie injection
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// from an insecure one (section 11.4); at an apex deployment it
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// would reach every subdomain, which production-deployment.md
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// says out loud. No preload: that is a shipped-list commitment.
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if config.ServesHTTPS() {
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w.Header().Set("Strict-Transport-Security", hstsValue)
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}
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// ReferrerPolicy sets the referrer information passed during navigation
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w.Header().Set("Referrer-Policy", "no-referrer")
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// CSP controls the resources the user agent is allowed to load for a page
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cspPolicy := "default-src 'self'; " +
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// Script comes only from this origin. The hypermedia library is
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// vendored into internal/embeds/static/ and served from /static/,
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// so the unpkg.com source this directive used to carry authorized
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// a CDN nothing loads from — a standing permission for
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// third-party script, flagged by the 2026-09 security audit.
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"script-src 'self'; " +
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"style-src 'self'; " +
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"img-src 'self' data:; " +
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"font-src 'self'; " +
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"connect-src 'self'; " +
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"object-src 'none'; " +
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"frame-ancestors 'none'; " +
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"form-action 'self'; " +
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"base-uri 'self';"
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// upgrade-insecure-requests only where the console is served
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// over https (base-url's scheme); on plain HTTP it would
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// upgrade every subresource to a scheme nothing listens on.
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if config.ServesHTTPS() {
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cspPolicy += "upgrade-insecure-requests;"
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}
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// Set Content-Security-Policy header
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w.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", cspPolicy)
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// Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy prevents cross-origin resources from being loaded
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w.Header().Set("Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy", "require-corp")
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// Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy prevents cross-origin documents from being loaded
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w.Header().Set("Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy", "same-origin")
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// Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy prevents cross-origin resources from being loaded
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w.Header().Set("Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy", "same-origin")
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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}
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// MaxBodySize limits the maximum size of request bodies
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// size parameter is in bytes
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func MaxBodySize(maxSize int64) Middleware {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// Skip restricting GET, HEAD, and OPTIONS requests as they shouldn't have bodies
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if r.Method == http.MethodGet || r.Method == http.MethodHead || r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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// Check Content-Length header first for efficiency
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if r.ContentLength > maxSize {
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http.Error(w, "Request body too large", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
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return
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}
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// If Content-Length is not set or potentially spoofed, use LimitReader
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r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxSize)
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// Continue to next middleware/handler
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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}
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