Files
member-console/scripts/agent-runner/README.md
T
cgalo5758 5829091881 Track the agent runner and its method page
The contained runner that drove the 2026-09 security audit, the README
review and four rounds of design ideation lived only inside the ignored
notebook. It moves to scripts/agent-runner/: the prepare, tools, audit,
ideation and teardown scripts, the compose and container files, the
allowlist proxy and the prompt templates, with the paths that assumed
the notebook fixed and findings written to a caller-named directory. Run
outputs, transcripts and the round-specific sheet scripts stay behind.

docs/agent-runner.md states the method: the disposable git archive
copy and the fail-closed proxy, how a task is shaped, union rather than
intersection of findings across models, separate adjudication of every
finding against the source, and the evidence a finding must carry.
2026-09-19 19:47:15 -05:00

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5.0 KiB
Markdown

# Agent runner
Runs a model from another family (DeepSeek, Gemini, GLM/Z.AI, Kimi) over a
disposable copy of this repository, inside a container whose only route off-box
is an allowlist proxy. Two lanes share that container: a **security lane**
(`run-audit.sh`), which audits a named slice of the code, and an **ideation
lane** (`run-ux.sh`), which answers a design brief with a proposal and a static
mockup. Each lane runs a fresh container per model, so no run inherits another
run's context.
The method these lanes serve, and the rules a finding has to clear before it
counts, are in [`docs/agent-runner.md`](../../docs/agent-runner.md).
## What it touches, and what it does not
- **Working tree:** never mounted. The model sees `git archive HEAD` unpacked
into `.code/` beside these scripts, which `teardown.sh` throws away. Edits it
makes go nowhere.
- **Network:** the model container sits on a Docker network marked `internal`,
which has no route off-box. Its only exit is a tinyproxy sidecar that denies
every host except the patterns in `allowlist.txt`. This is fail-closed: a
misconfigured proxy costs the run its network rather than leaking the code.
In practice the proxy refuses semgrep's telemetry and opencode's registry
fetches while allowing the model API. Read the denials with
`docker compose exec egress-proxy cat /tmp/tinyproxy.log`.
- **Credentials:** one secret enters a container, the opencode auth file at
`~/.local/share/opencode/auth.json`, mounted read-only. It holds the
model-provider keys. SSH keys, forge tokens, `test/secrets/` and the host
opencode config are never mounted. Point `AUDIT_AUTH_JSON` elsewhere if your
auth file lives elsewhere.
- **Live stack:** not involved. There is no database, no identity provider, no
webhook surface. Both lanes read code.
- **Findings:** land in the directory you name with `OUT`. Keep it outside this
one: this directory is tracked and a run's output is not.
## Security lane
```
./prepare.sh # once: export HEAD, build images, start the proxy
OUT=<dir> ./run-tools.sh # offline scanner pass -> $OUT/tools/
OUT=<dir> ./run-audit.sh # every model x every scope task -> $OUT/<timestamp>/
./teardown.sh # remove the containers, networks, images and the copy
```
The scanner pass runs first and offline: gosec, govulncheck, semgrep,
staticcheck and gitleaks write machine-readable output that task `08` gives the
model to triage. `run-audit.sh` runs it itself if `$OUT/tools/` is missing.
Inputs are the three files the prompt is built from:
| File | What it is |
|---|---|
| `AUDITOR.md` | How the model works, the evidence every finding must carry, the output shape |
| `CONTEXT.md` | The auth model, request pipeline and trust boundaries, supplied as fact |
| `scope/NN-*.md` | One slice each: the files, a one-sentence threat model, falsifiable questions |
Subsets and knobs:
```
OUT=<dir> MODELS="deepseek/deepseek-v4-pro" ./run-audit.sh 02-operator-boundary
OUT=<dir> TIMEOUT=3600 VARIANT=high ./run-audit.sh
```
`VARIANT` is reasoning effort and defaults to `max`; set it empty to omit the
flag. Model ids drift, so confirm them with `opencode models` and pass
`MODELS=` when the defaults in `run-audit.sh` are stale. To add a provider,
authenticate it on the host with `opencode auth login`, add its API host to
`allowlist.txt`, and name it in `MODELS`.
## Ideation lane
```
./prepare.sh # once, same as above
./run-ux.sh <brief-dir> # one lane per model -> <brief-dir>/out/<timestamp>/
```
The brief is yours; the runner carries no design content. `<brief-dir>` holds
four files, each overridable by the variable of the same name: `DESIGNER.md`
(how the model works and what it must produce), `CONTEXT.md` (the surface, its
constraints, what survives any redesign), `SCREENS.md` (what exists today) and
`brief.md` (the deliverable). `EXTRA=<file>` appends a file to the prompt;
`INCLUDE="<file> ..."` copies files into the disposable tree and names them for
the model to read. `OUT=<dir>` moves the output elsewhere.
Each lane writes `proposal.md`, `proposal.err` and `mockup.html`; `_static/`
holds the stylesheets the mockups link, so a mockup opens in a browser.
## Teardown
`./teardown.sh` removes the containers, both networks, the two built images and
the disposable copy, then prints a residue check. `--deep` also drops the base
images and prunes the build cache; `--verify-only` removes nothing and just
reports. Findings are untouched, because they never live here.
Every model container runs with `--rm`, so no opencode session or snapshot data
survives a run, and `auth.json` was read-only, so nothing was written back to
it.
## First build
`prepare.sh` is slow the first time. Everything the run needs from the network
is fetched at build time, where the Docker daemon still has normal egress: the
Go toolchain, opencode, the five scanners, the semgrep rule corpus, the Go
vulnerability database, and this project's module cache. At run time the
scanners are fully offline.